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One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights
MICHAEL W. CARROLL *
The United States and its trading partners have adopted cultural and
innovation policies under which the government grants one-size-fits-all
patents and copyrights to inventors and authors. On a global basis, the
reasons for doing so vary, but in the United States granting intellectual
property rights has been justified as the principal means of promoting
innovation and cultural progress. Until recently, however, few have
questioned the wisdom of using such blunt policy instruments to promote
progress in a wide range of industries in which the economics of innovation
varies considerably.
Provisionally accepting the assumptions of the traditional economic case
for intellectual property, this Article scrutinizes the presumption of
uniformity in patent and copyright law and makes three contributions. First,
it suggests three overarching metrics policymakers should use when
choosing among innovation-related policies: (1) the government’s
comparative ability to direct resources toward innovation likely to lead to
success; (2) the policy’s “administrability;” and (3) the questions of
political economy likely to effect a policy’s success. From this analysis, the
case for intellectual property rights emerges as a second-best solution
based on the uncertainty of innovation and the comparatively better
information possessed by private innovators.
Second, this Article shows that these same three metrics supply the case for
uniform intellectual property rights within the distinct domains of patent
and copyright law as a default initial domestic policy. Third, intellectual
property law is part of a dynamic system, and information obtained over
time will support proposals to tailor patents and copyrights to improve their
performance as innovation policy. Indeed, the distinction between patent
and copyright law is a form of high-level tailoring, and in addition patent
and copyright law each has been tailored in a number of ways by Congress,
the federal courts, and administrative agencies. Intellectual property
* Professor of Law and Director, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual
Property, American University, Washington College of Law. This Article is part of a
larger project. Helpful comments and conversations on this draft or related drafts have
come from Michael Abramowicz, Dan Burk, John Duffy, Rebecca Eisenberg, Brett
Frischmann, Mark Lemley, Glynn Lunney, Jr., Michael Madison, Peter Menell, Michael
Meurer, David Post, Pamela Samuelson, Josh Sarnoff and Polk Wagner. In addition,
participants in workshops or conferences at the Berkeley Law School, the University of
Augsburg, the University of Michigan, and the annual meeting of the International
Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property, also
offered helpful comments. William Freiberg and Edward Topolewski provided superb
research assistance. All errors remain mine.
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scholarship lacks a framework for assessing existing and proposed tailoring
measures. This Article proposes such a framework derived from the logic of
the traditional economic case for intellectual property. This framework
applies to a wide range of pending policy questions, such as whether, or to
what extent, software, business methods, tax shelters, or living organisms
should be patentable and whether, or to what extent, statutory licenses
should be granted for certain types of copyrighted works or for certain
types of use, and whether fashion design should receive sui generis
protection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal literature concerning intellectual property rights has grown in
recent years to advance our understanding of the history of copyright law and
the patent system, the economic functions of patents and copyrights, and the
conceptual frameworks used by courts, legislatures, and the general public to
understand intellectual property. It is generally accepted that the government
grants patents to inventors and copyrights to authors to promote innovation
and the development of culture and education. 1 Nonetheless, two yawning
gaps remain in the analysis of intellectual property as a means to achieve
innovative and creative ends.
First, when and why grant intellectual property rights? Granting
exclusive rights is only one of a number of options available to stimulate
investments in innovation and cultural production. Direct investments
through grant awards is another. 2 There is no generally accepted
framework—even within the subdiscipline(s) of economic analysis of law—
for assessing the trade-offs between granting intellectual property rights,
investing public funds directly in innovation through grants or prizes or
indirectly through tax policy, or some combination of these to encourage
desired levels of inventive and creative activity. 3
Second, to the extent that there is good reason to rely on the intellectual
property rights strategy, why tailor rights by distinguishing patents,
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets but then grant patents and
copyrights as usually one-size-fits-all bundles of rights when these rights
impose significant social costs and the inventors and authors who receive

1 See infra notes 16–21 & accompanying text (discussing the policy goals for
intellectual property rights).
2 See, e.g., Omnibus Appropriations Act, H.R. 1105, 111th Cong. (2009) (increasing
budgets for scientific research through the National Institutes of Health and the National
Science Foundation by billions of dollars).
3 Some commentators have addressed the question and made important
contributions, but these have not led to a fully developed policy framework. See Nancy
Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 53, 71 (Adam Jaffe, Joshua
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2002) (sketching in the beginning of such analysis); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693,
1712–24 (2008) (same).
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these rights are quite differently situated? 4 Indeed, the problem of
“uniformity cost”—the social cost attributable to the lack of fit between our
innovation goals and the blunt means of one-size-fits-all patents and
copyrights—is at the heart of most contemporary problems with intellectual
property law.
The concept of uniformity cost is somewhat abstract, but it is central to
understanding the economics of intellectual property. Uniformity cost is
analogous to the more familiar economic concept of opportunity cost—the
cost, say, of giving up option A in favor of option B. 5 Patent and copyright
law define the range of options or opportunities that inventors and authors on
one side, and members of the public on the other, may legally act on with
respect to certain forms of information, such as a narrative or the formula for
manufacturing a pharmaceutical compound. When choosing whether to
assign an information entitlement to inventors/authors or the general public,
intellectual property policymakers must take into account, to the extent
feasible, the foregone outcomes that result from this choice. One-size-fits-all
patents and copyrights effectively bundle a large range of potential uses and
make the assignment of information entitlements a decision about assigning
very large bundles of activities to one side or the other.
Uniformity cost is the social cost that arises when a particular use has
been assigned to the party who is less able to make a socially productive use
of the opportunity. In the worst case, the mistaken assignment empowers the
entitlement holder to thwart a range of potentially productive activities—
whether that is because the assignment to the public scares away capital
investment necessary to further develop valuable information or because the
assignment of a property right undercuts the productive capacity of a range
of innovators or creators in the general public.
While the term “uniformity cost” is of relatively recent vintage, the
problem it describes is not new, and the law already deploys a range of
strategies to mitigate uniformity cost. Tailoring rights is one such strategy.
However, while patent and copyright law already have been tailored in a
number of respects, scholars have not developed a general framework for
assessing whether these tailoring measures reflect successful rent seeking,
successful fine tuning, or both. 6
This Article analyzes the gaps in the standard economic case for granting
intellectual property rights in general and uniform intellectual rights in
particular and articulates an evidence-based framework for refining the
4 See infra Part III (discussing the costs of uniform rights).
5 Thanks to Brett Frischmann for this insight.
6 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court:
A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 17 (2003) (advancing a formal model
showing the trade-offs).
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intellectual property rights strategy and for recognizing when alternative
policies would be preferable to intellectual property. For purposes of this
Article, I provisionally confine the analysis to the frame imposed by
traditional welfare economics, as modified by the new institutional
economics, which together dominate the law-and-economics literature on
intellectual property. The argument for the tailoring framework emerges as a
logical extension of this approach to the field. However, periodically, I point
out in text or in the notes certain limitations on, or difficulties with, using this
form of economic analysis to support policies aimed at welfare
maximization.
With this proviso in mind, the Article argues that three general criteria
should frame the comparative analysis of granting intellectual property rights
and other policy options. First, policymakers should assess the relative
abilities of government officials and potential authors, inventors and their
financial backers, to predict innovative success, recognizing that “success” is
a value-laden objective and that investments in technological and cultural
progress are uncertain however success is measured. 7 Second, they should
assess the “administrability” of a proposed policy option. This criterion
combines assessments of relative administrative cost and robustness against
attempts to game the system. 8 Finally, considerations of political economy
should be given due weight. Theoretical models of innovation policy tradeoffs have their place, but the historical concentration of innovative and
creative production in certain industries has given these industries certain
forms of influence with public officials that must be acknowledged when
fashioning policy that is supposed to do real and important work in the real
world. 9
On the question of reducing uniformity cost, this Article argues that
much more work needs to be done, and it proposes an analytical framework
to guide this future work. Currently, economic analysts of intellectual
property rights seem resigned to accept the intractability of certain problems
posed by unitary patent and copyright systems, a sense best captured by
Professor Clarisa Long: “The same might be said of a unitary patent system
that Winston Churchill famously said about democracy: It’s the worst form
of patent system, except for all the others that have been tried.” 10
Respectfully, I disagree. As a descriptive matter, neither patent law nor
copyright law is entirely unitary. At its most extreme, statutory law has been

7 See infra note 51 & accompanying text (discussing uncertainty).
8 See infra Section V.B (discussing administrability).
9 See infra Section II.C (discussing political economy).
10 Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. LAW. 44, 49 (2008)

[hereinafter Long, Uniform Patent System].
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tailored to extend sui generis exclusive rights to inventions of new plants,
plant varieties, certain designs, semi-conductor chip masks, and boat hull
plug molds. 11 As of this writing, certain fashion designers are lobbying to
add fashion design to this list of intellectual property misfits. 12 Less extreme
are the multiple measures through which Congress has augmented or
diminished rights under patent and copyright law with respect to inventions
such as pharmaceutical drugs, inventions arising from federally-funded
research, and works of authorship in music, architecture, and software, to
name a few. 13 Current writing about intellectual property strives to
marginalize these measures, and, as Professor Joseph Liu has recognized
with respect to copyright law, as a result analysis of tailored intellectual
property rights is undertheorized. 14
As a normative matter, intellectual property rights should be tailored to
reduce uniformity cost. While there are less direct strategies—deploying real
options and flexible standards that render formally defined uniform rights
more pliable in application 15 —these are not a complete answer to the
problem of uniformity cost. Tailoring will sometimes be the only solution.
The catch is that tailoring intellectual property rights well is not easily done.
The practical obstacles are substantial, and it is for this reason that the
conceptual frames of unitary patent and copyright systems dominate the
literature. But the distinction between patent and copyright is itself a form of
tailored protection, and within the domains of each branch of these forms of
intellectual property, rights have been tailored before and will be tailored
again. It is time to have a framework for analyzing this activity and to
recognize its potential value in rendering intellectual property rights better
suited to their task(s).
Proposing such a framework is the principal goal of this Article, and here
is the roadmap for how the analysis proceeds. Section II shows how three
considerations—information asymmetries, administrability concerns, and
questions of political economy—explain the dominance of intellectual
property rights as the primary innovation and cultural policy in the United
States. Section III shows that these same considerations explain the default to
11 See Michael W. Carroll, The Law of Tailoring in Intellectual Property (June 24,
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Carroll, Law of
Tailoring] (describing each of these tailored provisions).
12 See infra note 256 & accompanying text (discussing the Design Piracy Act).
13 See Carroll, Law of Tailoring, supra note 11.
14 See generally Joseph Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 105–06
(2004) (discussing industry-specific provisions of the Copyright Act).
15 See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 857–61 (2006) [hereinafter Carroll,
One for All].
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uniform patents and copyrights as an initial matter. Section IV shows,
however, that Congress, the federal courts, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the Copyright Office have each tailored
rights granted by patent and copyright law to some degree. Finally, Section V
delivers the proposed framework for gathering and assessing evidence of
uniformity cost and deciding whether a tailoring response is desirable and
feasible.

II. WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?
The standard economic case for patent and copyright law is quite
familiar. This Section recites only those aspects relevant to the debate
concerning uniform and tailored rights. This Section also calls attention to
often overlooked dimensions of the case for intellectual property regarding
its history, and the respective roles of comparative administrative costs and
considerations of political economy.
The general case for intellectual property starts with the problem. In a
competitive economy, we should expect underinvestment in creative and
inventive endeavors without some form of government assistance. Once an
author, inventor, or their respective financial backers has paid for the creation
of a valuable creative or innovative work, competitors can reproduce and
distribute that work at prices too low for those who invested in the creation to
recoup their investments. 16
The standard economic solution to this public goods or appropriability
problem 17 is government action. In the United States, the Constitution grants
Congress a range of powers from which it may fashion solutions. First,
Congress has power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their Respective Writings and discoveries.” 18 The idea is simple enough.
Copyrights and patents are bundles of rights designed to stimulate
investments in the activities that drive progress by excluding direct
16 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1474, 1476 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=741424#
Paper Download.
17 Some commentators argue that the public goods model maps poorly to works of
authorship. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A
Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 693–703 (2008) (arguing that potential
for spatial competition alters analysis of the appropriability problem but maintaining
fealty to uniform copyright for some of the reasons set forth in Part III infra); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TUL. L. J. TECH.
& INTELL PROP. (forthcoming 2009).
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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competition with the rightsholder in the marketplace. The owner of such
rights will enjoy the reward of monopoly pricing if there is sufficient demand
in the market for the underlying innovation. 19
These rights must be limited, however. While solving one problem,
intellectual property rights create another by supplying rightsholders with
powerful weapons against end-users, direct competitors and follow-on
innovators who seek to bring socially beneficial innovations to market. 20 To
promote progress, intellectual property law must strike a balance, providing
sufficient incentives for innovation without unduly stifling the efforts of
follow-on innovators or the liberties of end-users. While many proponents of
intellectual property rights treat this move from problem to property as
automatic, it is not. 21 Administering an intellectual property regime is
socially costly, and the intellectual property strategy is merely one option
that policymakers may deploy to encourage investments in creation and
invention in the face of competition.
The second power from which Congress can craft a solution to the
appropriability problem is “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common defence and general
Welfare of the United States.” 22 It is fair to assume a correlation between the
“promotion of progress” and “provision of the general welfare,” and thus
these two powers create in effect two currencies that government may use to
spur innovation—exclusive rights, which provide an indirect subsidy through
the promise of potential monopoly profits, indirect subsidies through tax
expenditure or market regulation through other tax policies, or direct
spending on innovation either through direct employment or through a
system of grants, rewards or prizes for creators and inventors.
Third, Congress has power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” 23 This power
enables direct regulation of markets for information or for informationintensive goods—such as new drugs 24 —and for less direct regulation
19 See, e.g., Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1476–77.
20 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX.

L. REV. 1031, 1058–59 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding] (tallying the social costs
of intellectual property rights).
21 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1477 (“Whereas the earlier economics
literature proceeded as if intellectual property protection was the self-evident solution to
the incentive problem, a more recent literature . . . has tried to understand when that is
true, and when other incentive mechanisms might dominate.”).
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
23 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for
introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application
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through the creation of exclusive rights other than patents and copyrights,
such as trademarks 25 or rights against circumvention of technological
measures protecting works protected under Title 17. 26 Theoretically,
Congress could respond to the appropriability problem through a range of ex
ante regulations on entry, pricing or on contractual relations in informationintensive markets. 27 In addition, ex post regulation derived from the
Commerce power, such as antitrust litigation, interacts with any direct or
indirect regulation of these markets. The economic literature on intellectual
property generally assumes that exclusive rights will form the basis for
markets that will not be subject to additional regulation—with the large and
notable exception of the markets for pharmaceuticals and biologics—and that
ex post antitrust regulation is the most significant variable that models
supporting intellectual property must accommodate. 28 Although one could
argue that this assumption reflects a laissez-faire bias or a lack of regulatory
imagination, this Article accepts the working hypothesis that it would be
more efficient to tailor intellectual property rights within the respective
domains of patent and copyright law rather than to rely upon targeted
Commerce Clause-based regulation, with the exceptions of health and safety
regulation and antitrust regulation.
Finally, the scope of the above three grants of power are augmented by
the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.” 29 In fact, when the options are parsed more
closely, policymakers may select from, or combine, six strategies to solve the
appropriability problem:
1) direct provision of creators or innovators employed by the government;

filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such
drug.”).
25 See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1879) (holding that Commerce
Clause supports trademark legislation regulating interstate commerce but holding that Act
under review not so limited).
26 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (2006).
27 Thanks to Josh Sarnoff for this insight.
28 See, e.g., MICHAEL CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING
THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW (2009) (summarizing
literature and proposing model for relationship between intellectual property rights and
antitrust law).
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)
(generously construing scope of laws that are “necessary and proper”).
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2) direct compensation ex ante to the innovator for producing the
information (leaving the costs of reproduction and distribution to be borne
by participants in a competitive market), such as a grant to a promising
innovator;
3) direct compensation to the innovator ex post through a reward or prize
system for innovations already created, such as prizes awarded by a number
of federal government science agencies;
4) indirect compensation to the innovator through tax policy, by for
example giving tax credits for investments in research and development;
5) protection of innovators from competition through the grant of exclusive
production and distribution rights (thereby encouraging monopoly pricing),
by creating patent and copyright law; or
6) other forms of protection from competition or misappropriation by
increasing excludability of valuable information, by for example prohibiting
circumvention of technological protection measures. 30

These strategies can be, and usually are, combined in a number of ways,
but the intellectual property strategy must compete with these others for its
place in the policy mix. Theoretically, direct investment strategies are
superior to intellectual property because once the costs of creating and
commercializing a creative or inventive work have been financed, the
information should be in the public domain and goods incorporating this
information can be commoditized. 31 Competitive markets efficiently produce
and distribute commodity goods, such as personal computers, generic drugs
or books that are no longer under copyright. 32 Why, then, is not direct
payment to innovators the dominant innovation policy in the United States
and in most other industrialized economies? Direct payment to authors,
inventors or their creditors is impractical in many circumstances, and the
intellectual property strategy emerges as a second-best solution to the
appropriability problem.
30 See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE

FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 200–01 (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 96 (2001); Brett M. Frischmann,
Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology
Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 392–95 (2000) [hereinafter Frischmann, Innovation and
Institutions] (analyzing trade-offs among policy approaches).
31 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 132–33 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex
Post].
32 See id. at 135–39 (explaining benefits of competition to promote widespread
distribution).
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The case for intellectual property has had its ups and downs over time,
but in recent years it has enjoyed something of a free ride. The case faced
difficulties in Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century, where
the patent system had become tainted with the stink of monopoly. 33 Again, in
the late 1950s, Congress asked an eminent economist to study whether
continuing to support the patent system was worth its cost. The best he could
do was to shrug his shoulders: “[I]f we did not have a patent system, it would
be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic
consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent
system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.” 34
By the 1960s, however, in the depths of the Cold War, the pioneers of
modern law and economics wrapped the case for intellectual property in the
flag. Professor Kenneth Arrow, for one, declared that “[i]n an ideal socialist
economy, the reward for invention would be completely separated from any
charge to the users of the information” whereas “[i]n a free enterprise
economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create
property rights.” 35 Arrow recognized that the cost of a system of property
rights is that “precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an
underutilization of the information.” 36 But by framing the choice as between
socialism and “free enterprise,” readers were instructed that a reward system
for invention and a free enterprise economy are incompatible options.
Today, the case for intellectual property rights cannot disregard the
direct-compensation alternatives so summarily. As Arrow acknowledged,
direct compensation to innovators appears to be preferable to intellectual
property rights at first glance because this strategy avoids the social costs of
underutilization. 37 In the modern context an emerging literature supports this
33 See ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE

NETHERLANDS 1869–1912, SWITZERLAND 1850–1907 40–41 (1971); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 164–65 (2004). See generally Mark D.
Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (2002) (discussing arguments
for patent abolition); Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the
Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1–6 (1950).
34 SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 18 (Comm. Print
1958) (authored by Fritz Machlup), available at http://mises.org/etexts/ patentsystem.pdf.
35 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
614, 623–24 (Nat’l Bureau Comm. for Econ. Research, ed., 1962) (emphasis added)
(recognizing valuation problems and explaining government choice to procure defense
research directly by contract rather than through reliance on patent system).
36 Id.
37 For early work along these lines, see Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV.

1372

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:6

view, advocating for a range of institutional forms of direct compensation. 38
A leading economist, Professor Joseph Stiglitz, has endorsed the use of
prizes in the drug discovery context, 39 and Professor Steven Shavell further
observes that “in many plausible situations, the reward system would be
superior to the property rights system.” 40 For example, using the abstract,
formal methodology generally used to support the case for exclusive rights,
Professors Shavell and Ypersele show that giving the innovator the option to
choose either a reward calculated from ex post data, such as sales figures, or
exclusive rights would be preferable to the current patent system. Some
legislators also have been attracted to this approach. 41 This pressure on the
traditional case for intellectual property is most welcome, and there are
reasons to expect that this analysis may help alter the mix of government
policies in favor of direct compensation to some extent. More radical
economists have concluded that Malchup was too timid and that the absence
of historical data sufficient to support the case leads to the conclusion that
“intellectual property is an unnecessary evil.” 42
Nonetheless, the case for intellectual property rights retains its vitality in
light of three practical considerations necessary to assessing the feasibility
and desirability of the various strategies for solving the appropriability
ECON. STUD. 61 (1944).
38 See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging
Innovation, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1137, 1146–48 (1998) (discussing auction model as superior
to patent system); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should
Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124–
25 (1997) (subsidizing buyouts by using a coupon scheme); Steven Shavell & Tanguy
van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 526
(2001) (arguing in favor of optional system that allows innovators to be compensated
under current patent regime or reward system). A thorough and thoughtful contribution to
this literature is Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115
(2003).
39 See Joseph Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Medical Prize
Fund Could Improve the Financing of Drug Innovations, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1279 (2006);
Joseph Stiglitz, Give Prizes Not Patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 21.
40 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163 (2004).
41 See Medical Prize Innovation Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. (2005)
(proposing to prohibit ownership of exclusive rights in drugs or biological products and
creating a fund for Medical Innovation Prizes that would compensate medical
innovators). For the full-throated argument, see James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big
Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1528–34
(2007). A large bibliography of the relevant literature can be found at Knowledge
Ecology International, Scholarly and Technical Articles and Books on Innovation Prizes,
http://www.keionline. org/content/view/82/1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
42 See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 11
(2008).
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problem. These are: (1) the government’s ability, relative to private actors, to
value 43 certain types or classes of creation or innovation; 44 (2) the
comparative administrative cost of a strategy; (3) and considerations of
political economy associated with a particular strategy. By testing the case
for intellectual property in relation to these practical metrics, the empirical
and practical premises of the case are laid bare. Once exposed, the case for
uniform intellectual property rights articulated in Section III, the responsive
case for tailoring in Section IV, and the framework for tailoring in Section V
follow as the logical extensions.

A. The Innovation Lottery—Ignorance and Risk Spreading
What creative works or inventions will most benefit society? Who will
create or invent them? Must the government promise some form of reward to
induce these creators, inventors or their financial backers to bring these
creations or inventions into being and to share them with the public or find a
distributor to do so? 45 What kind of reward and how much of it is needed?
Policymakers can answer some of these questions some of the time, but
usually they must respond that they do not know. For example, within the
domain of technological innovation, the government can identify certain
research priorities, such as cures for disease, development of alternative fuel
sources, or the desire for a better glove for use in outer space. 46 But even
after this is done, identifying who should work on solutions and how much to
invest remain daunting challenges. In particular the challenge is exacerbated
because the distribution of returns to investments in research and
development is highly skew. 47 Thus, creativity and innovation usually are
43 Measuring value in this context is more complicated than space allows for full
discussion, but I recognize that value as measured by price is a relevant but hardly
exhaustive consideration.
44 Cf. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 38, at 534, 541–42 (“[T]he government’s
knowledge about the social value of innovations . . . is important to the performance of
the reward system.”). Shavell & van Ypersele argue that the government’s ex ante
valuations are irrelevant because a reward system can be tied to ex post data reflecting
demand for the innovation such as sales data. See id. at 541–42.
45 This question assumes current conditions concerning the relations between
government and the private sector remain intact. Changes in this relationship—through
changes in tax policy or market regulation, for example—would alter the range of
relevant responses as well.
46 See Jack Hitt, The Amateur Future of Space Travel, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007,
(Magazine), at 152 (describing NASA contest for space glove design).
47 See F. M. Scherer, Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 7530, 7535
(Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) (“So skew is the distribution of rewards that
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uncertain. 48 These observations limit the utility of any ex ante compensation
policy. 49 While, in theory, the government can manage this uncertainty
through post hoc rewards or prizes, the government will have difficulty in
many circumstances calibrating the reward to the social value contributed by
the creator or inventor.
These observations give rise to the ignorance justification for intellectual
property rights. On this view, government’s relative ignorance about the
incentives required to lure particular creators or innovators into the
information production and distribution game and to keep them in it justifies
the social costs imposed by intellectual property rights. These rights of
exclusion underwrite a system of innovator control that finances innovation
through the prospect and the occasional reality of supracompetitive profits in
the marketplace.
Information theory supplies the reason. While the ignorance justification
holds that the government is largely in the dark about the value of any
particular invention or creation, the inventors or creators will have, on
average, marginally better information about their potential success in the
markets for their respective intellectual outputs, and government strategies
for socializing this private information through some form of mechanism
design or otherwise are not likely to fully succeed. For this reason, the
consensus view among economically-oriented commentators is that
increasing an innovator’s ability to exclude (or at least deter) competitors
through exclusive rights is superior to reward because the system is driven by
the marginally superior private information that innovators enjoy. 50
Intellectual property rights are also supported by the cognate riskspreading justification. Uncertainty about innovation poses unquantifiable
risks for whomever chooses to venture labor and capital in pursuit of creative
or innovative success, however measured. If the government opts for direct
procurement of innovation through employment or grants, the government
it is difficult to make profits converge toward fairly stable averages by supporting
feasibly large project portfolios.”).
48 See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921)
(explicating the difference between conditions of “risk”—randomness with known
probabilities—and “uncertainty”—randomness with unknowable probabilities).
49 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1477 (“Probably the most important
obstacle to effective public procurement is in finding the ideas for invention that are
widely distributed among firms and inventors.”).
50 See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic
Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2000); Lunney, supra
note 6, at 3, 5 n.9 (“[T]he principal advantage of a regime of exclusive rights is that such
a regime . . . tends to decentralize the decision-making process, assigning decisionmaking responsibility to those likely to possess the relevant, but otherwise private,
information.”); Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 38, at 528.
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concentrates the risk of failure in itself. As against this strategy, intellectual
property rights spread the risk of failure among potential rightsholders who
either may fail to produce information that qualifies for protection or who
may succeed in acquiring rights only to have the market deem these worth
less than the cost of acquisition. From the resource allocation perspective,
spreading the risk of failure among investors with private information is
likely to be marginally more efficient than concentrating this risk in the
government. For, while potential innovators may, on average, enjoy better
information than the government about potential success, the risks to private
investors are quite substantial. Indeed, as anyone who watches American Idol
or any of the other talent competitions currently in vogue on television
knows, in individual cases, many artists or inventors are mistaken if not
deluded about the market potential of their talent, their newly composed song
or new invention. 51
The risk spreading justification for intellectual property operates
differently with respect to the reward or prize strategy, which enables the
government to spread the risk of failure among potential innovators while
also avoiding the social costs of intellectual property rights. Prizes or rewards
must be designed to produce the desired expected value in the mind of
innovators and creators, and there are three types of risk that the government
must manage: (1) identifying the kinds of inventions and creative works
eligible for reward; (2) identifying the stage of development at which to grant
rewards; and (3) quantifying the reward. The prize or reward strategy
concentrates the risk of error in any of these three decision points in the
government.
When designing intellectual property rights, the government still risks
error at each of these same decision points, but the magnitude of risk is
reduced because, as is discussed in greater detail below, markets enabled by
intellectual property rights have flexible features that correct to some degree
for misallocation of rights. These markets also potentially spread decisions
about which risks should be undertaken and who should bear them. 52
Markets also spread discipline for those who waste assets in pursuit of
creative or innovative goals. Finally, a less tangible risk that intellectual
property rights spreads is the risk of cheating by counterparties. For a prize or
reward strategy to succeed, potential innovators must trust that the
51 Our reliance on the allegedly superior information of private innovators is a

subject warranting further study. We know from experience that innovators often
misjudge the likely market value of their innovations. For example, a number of
pioneering inventors undervalued their innovations. See, e.g., Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex
Post, supra note 31, at 139 (collecting sources).
52 See infra Section V.A.6 (discussing relation between design of intellectual
property rights and decision architecture).
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government will pay when a reward has been earned. In the markets enabled
by intellectual property rights, the potential sources of revenue are spread
among consumers, and the risks that they will take valuable information
without paying also is spread. Whether spreading this risk through copyright
law remains an efficient form of cultural policy has become the subject of
intense debate in light of the changed circumstances known as the Internet.
Digital networks have greatly increased the capacity for counterparties to
cheat on the copyright bargain, and rights owners have pursued a range of
public and private strategies to improve their enforcement capacity that often
entail a range of collateral consequences for digital communication. 53
In light of the current state of research about, and experience with,
alternatives to intellectual property, the risk spreading justification generally
remains persuasive. But it is weakest when applied to the prize or reward
strategy. More research and experimentation with this approach is warranted
because the value of eliminating or reducing the social costs of intellectual
property rights could be significant, particularly in the fields of health and
agriculture with respect to patents and in the domain of digital
communication with respect to copyright. 54 This research should take into
account developments in the cognitive sciences about risk perception and
expected value.
An additional feature of decentralization supports exclusive rights over
direct compensation with respect to culture. It might be possible for the
government to overcome its ignorance by identifying those creators most
likely to produce valuable works and rely on their superior skills and private
information to direct initiatives to develop new artistic and educational
works. The government has partially adopted this option in the sciences
through grants administered by the National Institutes of Health 55 and the
National Science Foundation. 56 The cultural output of creative laborers hired
53 See generally Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95
GEO. L.J. 1 (2006) (describing actual and potential consequences of digital enforcement
initiatives); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004) (proposing
cheaper enforcement procedure to limit potential collateral damage from other
enforcement initiatives).
54 See generally FISHER, supra note 30, ch. 6 (proposing a reward-like compensation
scheme for creators in exchange for authorizing file sharing of music and film); Neil W.
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003) (making similar proposal).
55 See National Institutes of Health, Office of Extramural Research, U.S. Dept. of
Health & Human Servs., Types of Grant Programs, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/
funding_program.htm (last visited July 3, 2009) (describing types of grants provided by
NIH).
56 See National Science Foundation, About Funding, http://www.nsf.gov/funding/
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by the Works Progress Administration during the Depression indicates that
this option is not entirely fanciful even in the realm of cultural production. 57
However, precisely because the government lacks a common metric by
which to value ex ante and ex post cultural works in particular, it is better to
reject a policy that relies principally on direct government investment in the
arts. 58
While this Article generally remains within the confines of standard
economic analysis, here it is necessary to call attention to the problem of the
gap between willingness-to-pay (WTP) and ability-to-pay (ATP). This gap
poses a significant obstacle for the standard argument favoring
decentralization through private investment and market exchange and is a
drawback that receives insufficient attention in the literature. 59 The
information and product markets supported by intellectual property rights
operate on the basis of users’ ability to pay rather than willingness to pay to
reflect the social value of innovation. As a result, the innovations or
innovators selected for reward by “the market” will skew toward the interests
of those with an ability to pay, who more often than not are the relatively
rich. 60 Using prices to allocate access to goods and services does not
accurately reflect how relatively important that access is to different
individuals because what a dollar is “worth”, and therefore the value of what
a dollar buys, sometimes depends on how many dollars one has. For
example, a devoted fan of a particular musical group may scrimp and save to
purchase a $100 concert ticket; whereas, a wealthy individual may attend the
concert at that price on a lark because the cost is relatively negligible to that
aboutfunding.jsp (last visited July 3, 2009) (describing range of NSF funding).
57 See generally WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, FEDERAL RELIEF ADMINISTRATION AND
THE ARTS: THE ORIGINS AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF THE ARTS PROJECTS OF THE
WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (1969) (describing federal government support for
the arts as part of the New Deal).
58 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1799, 1809–10, 1814 n.43 (2000) (“[B]ecause judging the ‘value’ of most cultural works
is an inherently subjective exercise, it is not clear that we want any one individual or
entity to control decisions about which uses of a work are valuable.”); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 352–59 (1996).
59 See Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Frischmann, Spillovers Theory],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1357688 (“[T]here are
good reasons to question whether willingness to pay is a consistently effective
mechanism for assessing demand where information systems are involved because of the
prevalence of spillovers.”).
60 On the difficulties of measuring the gap between willingness-to-pay and abilityto-pay in the health care context, see, e.g., Steven Russell, Julia Fox-Rushby & Dyna
Ahrin, Willingness and Ability to Pay for Health Care: A Selection of Methods and
Issues, 10 HEALTH POL’Y & PLANNING 94 (1995).
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person. There are likely many other potential fans who, if wealthier, would
be willing to pay more than the wealthy concert-goer for the privilege of
attending the show, but the market does not have an effective means for
reflecting and valuing these poorer fans’ interests and is therefore a poor
proxy for social value.
The starkest example of the ways in which relying on ability to pay as a
measure of improving human welfare misallocates resources is in the
financing of drug discovery. The patent system directs significant resources
to the discovery and development of so-called “me-too” and “lifestyle” drugs
for which wealthy consumers in industrialized economies are able to pay a
hefty premium. 61 These resources are not directed toward discovery and
development of cures for tropical diseases because the likely beneficiaries
lack the ability to pay such premiums, 62 even though their willingness to pay
for a drug that would keep a child alive almost certainly is greater than what
an aging consumer in the industrialized world would be willing to pay to
enhance his (and perhaps soon, her) sexual performance. The likely
distortionary effects on resource allocation that follow from the gap between
willingness-to-pay and ability-to-pay for innovation should serve as a signal
for policymakers when choosing the right mix of intellectual property and
direct compensation approaches. For fields of creativity or innovation in
which the gap is significant, the direct compensation strategy, coupled
perhaps with a tax strategy, 63 is likely to perform better. 64
In sum, as against a centralized government compensation scheme or
prize fund, the intellectual property strategy offers the benefits of
decentralization. 65 This strategy harnesses the sometimes superior private
61 See, e.g., Love & Hubbard, supra note 41, at 1523–24 (describing incentives and
costs associated with “me too” drugs).
62 See generally WILLIAM FISHER & TALHA SYED, DRUGS, LAW, AND THE GLOBAL
HEALTH CRISIS (2007) (describing economics of drug discovery for tropical disease and
proposing method for creating incentives to invest in such discovery).
63 Analyzing the range of tax policies that could be deployed to solve the
appropriability problem, alone or in combination, is beyond the scope of this Article but
is an inquiry worthy of further study.
64 See, e.g., Eleanor C. Saulo et al., Willingness and Ability to Pay for ArtemisininBased Combination Therapy in Rural Tanzania, 7 MALARIA J. 227 (2008) (finding gap
between willingness-to-pay and ability pay for antimalarial drug in Tanzania and
concluding that data support government policy to subsidize purchases of the drug).
65 See Lunney, supra note 6, at 3. Decentralization is relative. In a dynamic
environment, intellectual property limits market entry, which has the effect of
centralizing some decisions that would be better distributed among competitors. See Tim
Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures, 92 VA. L. REV. 123,
127–31 (2006) (arguing that intellectual property law should be tailored to encourage
hierarchical or polyarchical decisionmaking about innovation depending upon industry
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information that creators and innovators have about the value of their cultural
or technological contributions and spreads the risk that they and their
financial backers may be mistaken about the practical feasibility of a creative
or innovative idea and about its market valuation if realized. It also spreads
the risk of mismeasuring the timing or amount of reward necessary to induce
desired innovations and creative works. The social cost of this strategy is that
resources are channeled to innovations likely to serve those with an ability to
pay, and these innovations are likely to be underutilized by those who are
priced out of the market by monopoly prices or by those who are denied
licenses because the transaction costs are too high or the rightsholder refuses
to license. 66 The market also is likely to skew toward production of
consumption information goods rather than productive information goods
because of the problem of valuing positive spillovers. 67 After balancing these
costs and benefits, policymakers must then assess whether whatever net
benefits this strategy yields are comparatively worth the administrative cost.

B. Administrative Cost
Any strategy for financing innovation comes with a price. Someone must
be paid to perform an adjudication function to identify those deserving to
receive entitlements or to enforce entitlements already granted. In addition, a
policy must support a transaction structure. Since the focus of comparative
institutional analysis is on the total social benefits and costs, it is important to
assess the efficiencies associated with how a strategy performs these
functions without regard to whether they are financed directly by taxpayers
or indirectly by consumers who pay supracompetitive prices.
Under a direct compensation strategy, the government directly finances a
greater share of total administrative costs by supplying one or more agencies
responsible for identifying and rewarding innovators. Some of these
personnel costs would be borne by existing agencies, such as those who
administer the tax system, 68 while others might be borne by agencies that
would have to be created to implement a particular approach. If the
compensation scheme is ex ante, then a grants mechanism would be required
similar to that used by granting agencies such as the National Institutes of
Health. If a reward or bounty were offered for innovation, an agency would
maturity and other factors).
66 See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257, 278–79 (2007).
67 Id.
68 See Kremer, supra note 38, at 14 (explaining that taxation of pharmaceuticals will
have “benign consequences”); Lichtman, supra note 38, at 130–31; Shavell & Ypersele,
supra note 38, at 544 (noting simply that taxation is required).
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be required to determine the parameters under which rewards are available
and whether a reward had been earned. Under post hoc compensation
schemes, the agency would also be responsible for metering value to
calculate the reward. These direct administrative adjudication or examination
costs would likely be higher than those associated with an intellectual
property strategy, even if the government were to deploy some form of
examination prior to granting rights.
In exchange for substantial direct administrative costs associated with
identifying those innovators deserving financial reward and administering the
associated financing, direct compensation policies involve minimal costs
associated with supporting a transaction structure. Information would be in
the commons and would not require administrative support for licensing and
litigation. Taking these trade-offs into consideration, some proponents have
argued that their proposals are no more, and may prove far less, expensive to
administer than the intellectual property system. 69
In contrast, the intellectual property strategy leaves most of the total
administrative costs in private hands. 70 Traditionally, the costs of deciding
which innovators deserve financial reward has been borne by intermediaries
with access to capital who fund a variety of screening mechanisms through
which a creative work or innovation must pass before gaining access to
substantial capital. In the creative fields, this screening function has been
performed by literary agents and editors at book publishing houses, managers
and artists-and-repertoire employees in the recording business, agents and an
array of “suits” at movie studios, and their counterparts in the performing and
visual arts.
In the inventive fields, the function of judging innovations deserving
reward reflects a different mix of ex ante and post hoc decisionmaking. In a
number of fields, those who fund innovation bet on innovators, who they
bring inside the boundary of the firm through employment, rather than on
innovations. This strategy often depends upon the number of competitors and
whether short-term or longer-term rewards are sought. 71 In other fields that
rely on innovation, such as the toy business, companies rely on independent
69 See Lichtman, supra note 38, at 129–32 (discussing administrative costs of

proposed system); Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 38, at 543–44 (noting simply that
taxation is required).
70 One reason for private administration is lack of transparency in the operation of
the property system, particularly with respect to licensing activities. The lack of readily
available data about patent and copyright licensing raises the information costs for
government regulation of markets in which such licensing takes place. Thanks to Josh
Sarnoff for this point.
71 See S. Kurokawa, Make or Buy Decisions in R&D: Small Technology Firms in
the United States and Japan, 44 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 124, 124–
34 (1997).
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inventors, who pass through screens similar to those employed to sort
copyrighted works. 72
The intellectual property strategy also requires courts to enforce rights
and licenses, and, in the case of patents, for an agency to administer the
examination scheme through which the entitlement vests. 73 In addition, the
total costs of the transaction structure are far higher than under a direct
compensation scheme because users must obtain licenses or permissions, and
the boundaries of these transactions must be policed. 74 Measuring these
transaction costs is quite difficult because they are borne by a substantial
number of persons and entities. However, because the parties with superior
information about the value of their innovations must bear a portion of these
costs, they will have strong incentives to seek administrative efficiency. 75
For example, the percentage of patents that parties consider valuable enough
to enforce through litigation is quite low. 76
In the end, the direct compensation strategy likely involves lower total
administrative costs than the intellectual property strategy. Both require
financing of an adjudication function to identify which creators or innovators
deserve financial reward. With respect to this cost component, the intellectual
property strategy probably performs in a more cost-effective manner, leaving
aside for the moment the normative differences in the criteria for selecting
which innovators or innovations should receive financing. Although some
arbitrariness and corruption may occur in the process by which books are
selected for publication, movies for production, or music for recording, the
financiers are by-and-large publicly traded multinational companies subject
to discipline in the global capital markets. So it is likely that these actors are
likely to perform the identification function more cost-effectively than
government employees subject to public fiscal oversight, although this faith

72 See, e.g., Cynthia Wagner Weick & Cynthia F. Eakin, Independent Inventors and
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 6 INT’L J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & INNOVATION 5, 5–14
(2005) (finding that independent inventors surveyed invented primarily household
products, hardware and tools, industrial products, and novelty items and toys).
73 See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) (requiring application for patent).
74 See, e.g., Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421
F.3d 1307, 1315–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reviewing case law on claims of copyright
infringement resulting from exceeding scope of software license).
75 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302–07 (1996)
(using new institutional economic theory to justify use of property rule to encourage
bargaining toward a liability rule equilibrium).
76 See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 437–39 (2004)
(reporting the results of an empirical study of litigated patents).
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in comparative private sector efficiency is based as much on theory as data in
this context.
However, when the total costs of intellectual property licensing and
litigation are added to the equation, the intellectual property strategy
becomes quite expensive. With respect to total transactional costs, only the
roughest of estimates can be ventured. This is particularly true because for
comparative purposes; it is necessary to tease out those aspects of a
transaction that are necessary because of the presence of intellectual property
rights even though there may well be other parts of the deal which would be
present in analogous transactions in the shadow of the direct compensation
strategy. This is an important and largely intractable analytic task. I am not
aware of any studies that isolate the role of intellectual property rights in the
transactional setting, and it is hard to imagine how this might be measured or
tested directly. Litigation costs are somewhat easier to estimate, 77 although
the costs of pre-litigation threats and responses are fairly elusive. 78
Even with this uncertainty about the precise magnitude of licensing and
litigation costs, it is enough for present purposes to know that these are
significant. When compared to the very minimal costs to support a
transaction and litigation structure under a pure direct compensation strategy,
it is almost certain that the direct compensation strategy is less expensive to
administer, assuming that information produced by this strategy is in the
public domain and not amenable to contractual fencing.

C. Political Economy
Leaving the realms of theory and empirical analysis, analysts must
acknowledge that even when direct financing of innovation is more efficient,
three political considerations render the intellectual property strategy more
attractive to policymakers than the direct compensation strategies. First,
imposing taxes on the public indirectly through the creation of exclusive
rights is politically far cheaper than having to justify direct taxation and
direct expenditure of government funds on innovation. The grant of
77 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,

BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 132 (2008) (combining data
from the American Intellectual Property Law Association with authors’ data); Jean O.
Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the
Empirical Literature, in THE ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS OF INNOVATION 201, 202
(David Encaoua et al. eds., 2000) (finding that “the need to defend patents through costly
litigation can have significant impact on their value”).
78 While prelitigation costs are elusive, event studies enable some measure of the
costs of early stage litigation for public firms. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 77, at
132–38 (summarizing event study methodology and data for patent infringement suits
filed against publicly traded firms).
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intellectual property rights taxes the public in an indirect means to an
uncertain magnitude ex ante, causing the rights to be spent with far less
administrative evaluation of the social return on investment than is the case
with direct procurement. For example, in the current climate, increasing
income taxes has become politically very difficult. However, from an
economic perspective, when Congress extended the term of existing
copyrights by 20 years, 79 it passed a tax increase. Consumers of those
copyrighted works subject to the term extension will pay a copyright
premium that is analogous to the prize or reward that would be paid had the
government collected the funds through taxation and paid out directly. 80 This
dynamic suggests that, on the one hand, it could be politically difficult to pay
directly for innovations that improve social welfare and currently are induced
by the promise of intellectual property rights, and, on the other hand, that the
political costs of expanding intellectual property rights in response to rent
seeking are substantially lower than would be the case if the government
increased income taxes, or imposed more targeted use taxes, in order to pay
out to particular private interests.
In patent law, for example, patent examiners theoretically serve the
function of government contracting officers. 81 According to the terms of the
patent bargain, their role is to procure for the public only those inventions
worthy of a patent according to the law. The examiner must ensure that the
scope of any patent that issues is limited to that which the inventor has
contributed to the art. Although the actual interactions between patentees and
examiners is quite different from public procurement processes, in economic
effect, this negotiation is much like a contracting officer negotiating with a
government contractor over price. 82 Public pressure is much greater with
respect to contracts that impose direct costs on the public fisc—say, in the
79 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302–304 (2006)).
80 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244–45, 248–49 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing copyright’s function as a tax on readers and surmising that “one
might conservatively estimate that 20 extra years of copyright protection will mean the
transfer of several billion extra royalty dollars to holders of existing copyrights—
copyrights that, together, already will have earned many billions of dollars in royalty
‘reward.’”).
81 The gap between theory and practice on this point is significant. Those who study
the institutional arrangements and the incentives they produce inside the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office tell a story of an organization funded by application fees that treats
patent applicants as customers rather than suppliers. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, The PTO and
the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1988 (2009).
82 See, e.g., Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in
Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 346 (2007) (describing patent prosecution and
analogizing it to contract negotiation).
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form of a hammer that, for regulatory compliance reasons, appeared to cost
$435 83 —than it is with respect to issued patents that are invalid or overly
broad in scope. 84 This is not to say that the Patent and Trademark Office
never receives public rebuke for giving away the store when negotiating with
applicants. 85 But, from a comparative perspective, when they pay too much
or grant rights that are too broad, public officials are likely to receive much
greater negative publicity and public pressure with respect to procurement of
innovation through the direct expenditure of public dollars rather than the
granting of private rights through which dollars are indirectly extracted from
the public.
A related feature of public attention to price under the direct
compensation strategy—either by a mandatory reward system or through
exercise of eminent domain—is the Pied Piper problem in which the public’s
ex ante and ex post valuations shift. As most will recall, in Robert
Browning’s poem, The Pied Piper of Hamlein, 86 the piper agrees to rid
Hamlein of its rat infestation with his magic pipe for one thousand guilders.
After receiving the benefit of its bargain, however, the town council
breaches, claiming the contract price was a joke and offers the piper a mere
fifty guilders. We can imagine a similar set of circumstances occurring with
particularly valuable inventions, for which budget-strained administrators
would be tempted to manipulate the reward formula.
83 See James Fairhall, The Case for the $435 Hammer–Investigation of Pentagon’s
Procurement, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 47–52 (“In the three years since the story
broke, the $435 hammer has become synonymous with waste in the Department of
Defense (DOD). From Beetle Bailey to Walter Mondale, everyone has expressed outrage
at this apparent swindle.”).
84 Academic commentators agree that invalid patents are granted with some routine
frequency, but there is a division of opinion about what to do in response. See, e.g.,
Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal
Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1224–36 (2004) (arguing that
issued patents that are invalid are more costly than Lemley estimates and arguing for
greater expenditure in response); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that it is rational for the patent system to
accept relatively high error rate in granting patents); Arti K. Rai, Emerging Facts and
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1035, 1080–84 (2003) (agreeing in part but advocating some greater expenditure through
opposition proceedings to improve patent quality).
85 See, e.g., Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 84, at 1220 (“Reports of the [PTO] granting
absurd patents are rampant. Peanut butter sandwiches, pet toys on a stick, hammocks for
cats, and one-click shopping have each been the subject of a newspaper or magazine
story, and each serve as evidence of how ‘patently absurd’ the work of the [PTO] is.”
(citations omitted)).
86 See generally ROBERT BROWNING, THE PIED PIPER OF HAMELIN (1888), reprinted
at http://www.indiana.edu/~librcsd/etext/piper/.
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Consider, for example, the political viability of a reward scheme in the
case of operating system software. Whatever public disapproval of the wealth
Bill Gates has amassed in the market his company controls pales in
comparison to that which would ensue were he and his fellow shareholders to
receive a mulitbillion-dollar payout from the public fisc as a reward for
Windows—especially for Windows Vista! It appears that taxpayers in
industrialized economies generally are far more comfortable with winners in
the marketplace than with winners of government largesse even when the
government supplies the rights that make the market possible.
Second, the risk-spreading rationale reappears in a new guise. Recall that
this argument holds that some failure in attempted innovation is certain and
that markets are better suited to finance the costs of failure. Government can
withstand a fair degree of criticism for failed investments in biomedicine or
national defense technologies, but, at least in the United States, taxpayers
would be far more skeptical of a scheme in which the government hired
inventors of consumer goods or storytellers (such as filmmakers) and
songwriters to supply the public’s needs. (Although, the Walker Evans
photographs and folk music produced with support from the Works Progress
Administration are evidence to the contrary.) 87 Taxpayers in other industrial
economies have shown far greater acceptance of direct government funding
of cultural production and cultural institutions, 88 and thus some of the
observations about comparative political economy made herein are
necessarily culturally specific to the United States.
Nonetheless, however financed, we know that these investments will
sometimes be wasted. 89 The direct compensation strategy invites greater
negative political pressure from failure because it will be more visible and
palpable to voters and because they are likely to react far more negatively to
the centralization of risk in a set of government agencies than they are to the
consequences of self-deluded or mistaken inventors and creators who seek
wealth through intellectual property rights. Proponents of the direct
compensation strategy recognize and respond to the risk-spreading concern
by arguing that post hoc compensation schemes, such as rewards and prizes,

87 See, e.g., THOMAS NAU, WALKER EVANS: PHOTOGRAPHER OF AMERICA 35–37

(2007) (describing arrangement by which Evans as government employee took temporary
leave from government employment to take famous photographs of tenant farmers for
Fortune magazine but with copyright rights owned by the U.S. Government).
88 See, e.g., J. MARK DAVIDSON SCHUSTER, SUPPORTING THE ARTS: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY. CANADA, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
FRANCE, ITALY, GREAT BRITAIN, NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN, UNITED STATES, NATIONAL
ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS 42–47 (1985), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWeb
Portal/contentdelivery/ servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED257740.
89 See Scherer, supra note 47, at 7535.
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avoid the problem of paying for what is unwanted. 90 Prizes risk being set too
high or too low to induce the desired level of investment in innovation,
however. Rewards tied to market success are the closest approximation to the
beneficial risk allocation features of the intellectual strategy.
Third, while reward tied to market success would effectively neutralize
the risk-spreading concern, this design choice for direct compensation
highlights the most politically troublesome comparative disadvantage for the
direct compensation strategy—agency costs. A mechanism for direct
government pay-outs to innovators could be attractive to policymakers as a
means of personal enrichment or as a means to reward political supporters or
to threaten opponents. Experience with existing government grants to
science, education, and culture suggest that this concern may be overstated.
In the United States, political considerations undoubtedly play a role in
setting research priorities and in causing investments to be geographically
spread across congressional districts even if they might be more efficiently
concentrated in large urban research centers, but there has been little
evidence of outright self-dealing by politicians. Nonetheless, even if direct
investment were adopted for public-spirited reasons, administrative
corruption or incompetence could lead to manipulation for personal gain by
private actors. Finally, for rewards to be tied to market success, some form of
metering of use or other proxy for value must be created to measure how
strong the winners in the innovation game are. Any metering regime would
be susceptible to self-interested manipulation by the innovator and would be
likely to require widespread deployment of privacy-invasive technologies
and systems. 91
With respect to the intellectual property strategy, public sector agency
costs (in the economic sense of the term) are of two types. The first and most
often discussed is the problem of legislative and administrative capture. 92
This phenomenon results from the frequency and energy with which
90 See, e.g., George Johnson, Eureka! Where Do I Cash the Check, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.

29, 2008 (Week in Review) (summarizing history of prizes as incentive for scientific
innovation and remarking, “Best of all, the prize has to be paid only if there is a
winner.”).
91 Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J.
1, 3–19 (2006) (describing current privacy-invasive enforcement strategies by
rightsholders facing similar challenges).
92 According to this theory, legislative outcomes will be inefficient where discrete
groups with common interests can manipulate the legislative process so as to secure
redistributive legislation at the expense of large, heterogeneous groups that do not protect
their interests because the costs of collective action are too high. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 110
(1990) (“Because polities make and enforce economic rules, it is not surprising that
property rights are seldom efficient.”).
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rightsholders can make their case, which can lead to skewed perspectives
about the interests at stake. Legislators, administrators and their staff
members may favor proposals by rightsholders for self-interested reasons,
such as the hope or expectation of well-compensated employment by a
rightsholder or rightsholder organization, even when such proposals
effectively increase taxes on the public without a corresponding return in
creation or innovation. While interest groups clearly have outside influence
on intellectual property legislation and administration, 93 there are
countervailing checking forces in the process. The relative independence of
the judiciary limits the agency costs associated with interpretation of the
law. 94
Less well-recognized is the fact that the capacity for more directly
corrupt self-dealing by administrative officials in an exclusive rights regime
is cabined. Copyrights are granted without any government intervention,
eliminating opportunities for self-dealing at the entitlement-granting stage. 95
(However, the ready grant of such rights also affects the political economy of
intellectual property by enlarging the class of incumbents.) While a copyright
owner of a U.S. work must attempt to register her claim to copyright before
enforcing her rights, the rules are designed so that even if registration were
refused by a corrupt official seeking a bribe or other benefit from the
copyright owner, such a strategy would likely be unsuccessful. 96
The current design of the patent system entails somewhat greater risk of
self-dealing or corruption, but this risk is still relatively minimal. The
potential entry points for corruption are in the processes of patent
examination, re-examination, continuation, or re-issue. 97 Certain obvious
93 See, e.g., Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of
the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 53–56 (2000) (summarizing
public choice literature and providing examples of legislative capture in the intellectual
property context).
94 There is a large literature on public choice theory and the role of an independent
judiciary that need not be parsed here. The point is simply that because the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright law, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006), and
federal judges have life tenure, they are less likely to use the discretion inherent in
statutory interpretation for economically self-interested reasons than would be other
decisionmakers more dependent on industry largesse. For this elementary point, see
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
95 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 201 (2006) (describing eligibility for copyright and rules
for vesting).
96 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006) (Copyright owner may bring an infringement
action even after refusal to register by Copyright Office).
97 For example, in the litigation that threatened to render the Blackberries on which
many offices in Washington depend useless, the patent owner, NTP, alleged that the PTO
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risks, such as patent examiners’ potential conflicts of interest are addressed
by PTO rules, and these rules generally appear to be followed. Other forms of
graft or corruption in which patent examiners or other officials in the PTO
accept cash or in kind payments to deviate from their duties appear to be rare.
Finally, the risk of insider trading by officials also seems to be in check. This
risk is probably more significant among private sector insiders. 98

III. WHY ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS?
Accepting that intellectual property rights have a place in any
overarching innovation policy, this Section now turns to the question of how
the ignorance and risk-spreading rationales influence the definition of the
subject matter, scope, and duration of these intellectual property rights.
Conceivably, a single right or bundle of rights might do the job. 99 But,
since the eighteenth century rights granted to inventors and authors have
been tailored for historical reasons and to reflect economic differences
between functional innovation and creative progress. 100 Having tailored
had bent the rules with respect to a request for reexamination in order to respond to
pressure from Members of Congress who did not want to lose their connectivity. See
NTP, Response to Final Office Action of Feb. 24, 2006, Docket No. 49671.000006,
available at http://www.patenthawk.com/rulings/NTP-Reexam-Response.pdf. For present
purposes, the truth or falsity of these allegations is immaterial insofar as the allegations
illustrate the opportunities for self-interested officials to depart from established rules and
procedures.
98 See, e.g., Gautam Ahuja, Russell W. Coff & Peggy M. Lee, Managerial Foresight
and Attempted Rent Appropriation: Insider Trading on Knowledge of Imminent
Knowledge Breakthroughs, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 791, 805 (2005) (“Our results
suggest that managers do anticipate breakthrough innovations and trade on that
information before patent applications have been filed.”).
99 Some efforts during the first decade of the new millennium sought to merge the
branches of intellectual property into a single exclusive right on the grounds that
businesses no longer differentiate forms of intellectual property in practice. See Graeme
B. Dinwoodie, “One Size Fits All”: Consolidation and Difference in Intellectual
Property Law (July 21, 2008) (working paper presented at ATRIP Conference, Munich,
available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/5801021/one-size-fits-all). In some senses, the
idea is not new. The precursors to modern patents and copyrights were royal privileges or
letters patent granted into the eighteenth century that were ad hoc in scope and duration
but “uniform” insofar as they did not systematically differentiate rights based on whether
the subject was an invention or creative expression. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Whose
Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came To View Musical Expression As A Form Of
Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1405, 1452, 1465 (2004).
100 See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject
Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 524 (2003) (arguing that digital technology creates
pressure on the expression/function distinction between copyrightable and patentable
subject matter); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV.
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rights at this high level of generality, the law in the United States and in most
other nations then delineates patents and copyrights uniformly without regard
to context of invention or creation. Under U.S. patent law, an invention is
eligible for protection if it is a new, useful, and non-obvious “process,
manufacture, machine, or composition of matter.” 101 Each patentee receives
the same package of rights—to exclude others from making, using, selling,
offering to sell, or importing the invention 102 —for the same period of time—
20 years after the date an application was filed in the Patent and Trademark
Office. 103
Under U.S. copyright law, any “original work of authorship” that has
been “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” automatically gets a
copyright. 104 The owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to reproduce,
publicly distribute, and adapt the work. 105 In addition, for most classes of
work for which it would matter economically, the owner also has the
exclusive rights to publicly perform and publicly display the work. 106 The
initial grant of rights has been tailored for the music industry by limiting the
performance right in sound recordings to digital audio transmissions. 107 A
range of other provisions tailor the scope of copyright. 108
In previous work, researchers, including me, have shown that from a
theoretical perspective this policy of one-size-fits-all patents and copyrights
necessarily is inefficient. 109 The magnitude of the appropriability problems
that these rights are designed to remedy varies considerably across and even
within industries. 110 In particular, this policy imposes uniformity cost on
society by failing to supply fine-grained rights tailored to the economic
circumstances of different classes of authors and inventors. 111
465, 466–71 (2004) (making economic argument for tailoring subject matter of patent
and copyright).
101 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2006).
102 See id. § 271(a).
103 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
104 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
105 See id. § 106.
106 See id.
107 See id. § 106(6).
108 See, e.g., id. §§ 107–22.
109 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15 (citing sources).
110 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1575, 1581–83 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (comparing
the pharmaceutical industry, which requires a large research and development (R&D)
budget, to the computer software industry which can operate on a much smaller budget).
111 See id.
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Two recent books bring the problem of uniformity cost in patent law to
the fore. Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that the social costs
and benefits of nominally uniform patent rights vary significantly along
industry- and technology-specific lines, giving rise to a crisis in the patent
system that can be, and should be, solved through judicial tailoring. 112
Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer analyze whether patents
perform as economic theory expects property rights to do, and they conclude
that there is a significant gap between the patent system and a model property
system and that “[e]conomics research confirms that the effectiveness of
patents varies by type of invention.”113 Strikingly, both books provide a stark
depiction of uniformity cost by describing a system of one-size-fits-all
patents that works well for the chemical and pharmaceutical industries while
imposing a drag on innovation in the information technology industries. 114
How, then, does the proponent of uniform intellectual property rights defend
a system design that imposes this cost on society?
The argument for uniform rights is grounded in the same ignorance and
risk-spreading justifications as the intellectual property rights strategy. These
same asymmetries supply the basis for one-size-fits-all as an initial domestic
policy. The same uncertainty about innovation that justifies copyright and
patent in general also means that policymakers lack a solid basis for tailoring
rights to particular forms of expression, types of technology or to specific
industries. Whether uniform rights outperform tailored rights with respect to
administrative costs or public choice distortions depends on the context.

A. Public and Private Information
For the government to tailor rights according to subject matter or the
status of the innovator (such as a university researcher), the government
would require some basis for distinguishing among classes of innovation or
innovators. The ignorance justification for intellectual property rights also
justifies adopting uniform rights targeted at the average level of exclusion
needed to stimulate the desired level of investment in innovation throughout
112 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS

CAN SOLVE IT (Univ. of Chi. Press 2009).
113 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 77, at 256.
114 See id. at 16 (summarizing findings that “chemical and pharmaceutical firms
earn far more from their patents than they lose to litigation[,] [b]ut for other [public]
firms . . . [b]y almost any interpretation, the United States patent system could not be
providing overall positive incentives . . . by the end of the 1990s”); BURK & LEMLEY,
supra note 112, at 3–4 (stating that “[i]n the pharmaceutical industry, there seems to be a
strong consensus . . . that patents are critical to innovation . . . [whereas] [l]awyers and
executives in the information technology industries . . . almost invariably see the patent
system as a cost rather than a benefit to innovation.”).
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the economy. The government initially lacks the information necessary to
make principled distinctions among innovators or classes of innovation.
Moreover, innovation is inherently dynamic. 115 The case for uniformity
argues that even if the government were able to gather information sufficient
to make a principled distinction between the rights accorded to innovation
category A and innovation category B, the boundaries of those categories are
likely to change. 116 Technology-specific or subject matter-specific laws will
become outdated quickly and therefore fail to provide the efficiency gains
sought by tailoring. These practical obstacles to tailoring provide support for
uniform rights as a second best solution. Thus, uniform patents and
copyrights are second-order second best, or, in other words, a second-best
solution nested within the second-best solution of intellectual property rights.

1. Tailoring Through Market Exchange
The case for one-size-fits-all also holds that the intellectual property
strategy has built-in features to reduce uniformity cost. The argument starts
with a general proposition that generally-defined rights are easy to ascertain
ex ante and that any social costs arising from the choice of uniform rights do
not warrant concern because once the rights vest, private ordering ensures
that rewards generated by ownership of intellectual property rights flows to
those who deserve the rewards.
The magnitude of social costs incurred when the government rewards all
innovators with the same entitlement depends on the currency used. If the
government were to grant a uniform monetary entitlement to all inventors—
say a bounty of $1 million—whether their invention was a life-saving
biomedical device or a novelty toy, the social costs of uniformity would be
apparent and such a system would be grossly inefficient.
As I previously have discussed at greater length, intellectual property
rights harness three market-based features that
reduce uniformity cost: demand elasticity, price discrimination, and
Coasean bargaining. 117 The social costs of intellectual property rights arise
only when there is demand for protected information. If demand for a
novelty toy that would have been invented in the absence of protection is
zero, then even though granting uniform patent rights was unnecessary,

115 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of

Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 880–908 (1990) (categorizing stages of innovation
in different industries).
116 See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 110, at 1635–36 (making this argument
with respect to legislative tailoring).
117 This discussion summarizes Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 857–61.

1392

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:6

uniformity cost is zero because no potential buyers have been excluded. 118
Uniformity costs rise with demand. 119

Even when uniformity cost arises, under traditional economic analysis,
perfect price discrimination theoretically would eliminate the
underdistribution of protected information. That is, if intellectual property
owners are able to engage fully in first-degree price discrimination—selling
or icensing to each user willing to pay more than marginal cost—static
deadweight loss would be zero. 120
As others have shown, however, even as a matter of theory, perfect price
discrimination would not eliminate all social costs of intellectual property
rights. 121 Moreover, even if perfect price discrimination would theoretically

118 Id. at 858 n.44 (“Of course, demand for the invention does not refer to only

demand in product markets. Any potential user of information for which a patent owner
might make a credible threat must be plotted on the invention’s demand curve.”). For a
site dedicated to identifying such low-demand inventions, see Patently Silly, available at
http://www.patentlysilly.com.
119 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 858 n.45 (“Increases in demand for a work
also attract free riding competitors so that increases in demand increase both the
magnitude of the appropriability problem and the magnitude of social cost.”); cf. Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV.
483, 557 (1996) (incentives and access are both functions of degree of market power
conferred by exclusive rights). “Although we should expect rising demand to generate
correlated offsetting effects in many cases, when creators of popular works do not require
the power over price that patent or copyright promise, uniformity costs rise.” Carroll, One
for All, supra note 15, at 858 n.45.
120 See HAL VARIAN & CARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 39 (1999); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of
Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 303–04 (1970).
121 See, e.g., V. Bhaskar & Ted To, Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient?
An Analysis Of Free Entry, 35 RAND J. OF ECON. 762, 775 (2004); Aaron S. Edlin,
Mario Epelbaum & Walter P. Heller, Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient?
Welfare and Existence in General Equilibrium, 66 ECONOMETRICA 897, 897–99 (1998);
see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1799–
1808 (2000); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory Of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 978–80 (2005) (discussing distortionary effects of
promoting price discrimination); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Discrimination
Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 393 (2008) (explaining shortcomings of
conventional legal analysis of price discrimination); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law
and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 57–58 (2001) [hereinafter Meurer,
Price Discrimination].
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avoid reduction in social value, perfect first-degree price discrimination in
the intellectual property context is a practical impossibility . . . . 122

“Finally, when demand is positive and price discrimination is imperfect,
the Coase Theorem asserts that uniformity cost will affect allocative
efficiency only if reallocation or reapportionment of uniform entitlements by
contract is too costly.” 123 Through licensing and non-enforcement of
intellectual property rights, those who need to use another’s information will
obtain access and the practical ability to use it. Consequently, the theoretical
advantages of publicly tailored rights are minimized by tailoring through
private ordering supported by judicial and other public enforcement.
While licensing and enforcement practices undoubtedly relieve some of
the pressure that a one-size-fits-all approach produces, these are not complete
solutions. Most commentators agree that difficulties in valuing patents and
copyrights raise transaction costs to the point that allocative efficiency will
depend upon the subject matter, scope and duration of intellectual property
entitlements. 124 This is particularly true because the externalities that justify
patent and copyright law differ fundamentally from those that inspired
Coase, 125 and the law’s choice is not between granting an entitlement to
party A or to party B but between granting an entitlement to party A or to the
122 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 857–59; see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Brett

M. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1817, 1867 (2003) (noting that perfect price discrimination is impossible);
Lemley, supra note 20, at 1059 n.115; Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 255, 255–56 (2004) (same).
123 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 857–59; see R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960) (“In these conditions [of high transaction costs]
the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the
economic system operates.”). While arguing that policymakers should recognize the
effects they have on allocative efficiency when fashioning legal rights for hightransaction-cost environments, Coase also recognized that distributional justice matters
and that “the choice between different social arrangements for the solution of economic
problems should be carried out in broader terms than this [maximizing total output] and
that the total effect of these arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into
account.” Coase, supra, at 43.
124 See, e.g., James Bessen, Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations With
Private Information, 82 ECON. LETTERS 321, 326 (2004) (showing that “[t]he possibility
of ex ante licensing does not eliminate the problem of holdup in cumulative innovation”);
Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823,
831–36 (2000) (arguing that uncertainty in valuation of patents on basic research tools is
likely to block efficient licensing of such tools).
125 See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 20, at 1031; Mark A. Lemley, What’s
Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1098–1100 (2005) (reply
essay); Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post, supra note 31, at 129–35.
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public at large, comprised of an unknown and often unknowable proportion
of higher- and lower-valued users. Consequently, allocative inefficiency in
intellectual property law potentially imposes a far more significant social
cost than it does with respect to tangible property. 126 Uniformity cost is then
a real problem in intellectual property law.
The proponent of uniform intellectual property rights would be likely to
be a transaction cost optimist. Such a proponent would argue in the
alternative that if transaction costs are high enough to distort allocative
efficiency, this is simply the price society must pay for reliance on the
imperfect institution of rights of exclusion.

2. Tailoring Through Real Options and Standards
Recognizing uniformity cost, the proponent for one-size-fits-all patents
and copyrights also is likely to call attention to two strategies that I have
discussed more fully elsewhere that patent and copyright law currently
deploy to reduce the costs of one-size-fits-all rights. 127 First, both bodies of
law use real options by placing conditions on the full enjoyment of these
rights. These options force potential rights owners to self-sort, thereby
reducing social costs by tailoring the number of entitlements granted and
producing coarse-grained information about the private valuation of the
entitlement. Patent law uses the strategy more vigorously, requiring an
inventor to undergo examination prior to acquiring a patent 128 and further
requiring payment of maintenance fees at three intervals to retain rights
during the full statutory duration of a patent. 129 By placing an option filter at
both the front and back ends of the patent term, the law causes many
inventions that satisfy the statutory subject matter criteria either not to be
patented or to enter the public domain prior to expiration of the full term of
protection.

126 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 66, at 275.
127 Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 878–900.
128 See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639 n.44 (2002)
[hereinafter Long, Patent Signals] (listing several differing sources that estimate the
range of production costs and noting that $20,000 is a conservative estimate).
129 Utility patents that issue from applications filed on and after December 12, 1980,
are subject to the payment of maintenance fees necessary to maintain the patent in force.
Fees are due 3 1/2, 7 1/2 and 11 1/2 years from the date the patent is granted. 35 U.S.C.
§ 41(b) (2006). A 6-month grace period is provided during which the maintenance fee
may be paid with a surcharge. 37 C.F.R. § 1.362(e) (2005). Failure to pay the current
maintenance fee on time may result in expiration of the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 1.362(g)
(2005).
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Regrettably, copyright law has abandoned the so-called “formalities” and
renewable terms that served as analogous real options with regard to the
acquisition and retention of the entitlement. 130 All that remain are the
registration requirement for initiating an infringement action with respect to a
U.S. work and the conditional remedies tied to registration. 131 For this
reason, the problem of uniformity cost has intensified in copyright law.
Second, when taken off the rack, a patent or a copyright appears to be
only one size. But the fabric of both entitlements is elastic because the rights
are defined by standards rather than rules. Thus, when measured by a court in
the context of a particular case, the scope or size of a patent or copyright is
necessarily tailored in some respects to conform often to industry-specific,
technology-specific, or innovator-specific characteristics. Legal standards
confer interpretive discretion on adjudicators. This interpretive discretion can
be deployed ad hoc or systematically. With respect to the scope of
intellectual property rights, courts can choose to use flexible doctrines to
strike the incentives-access balance either on a per-work 132 or per-invention
basis, or more broadly along industry-specific or technology-specific
lines. 133 In the case of patent injunctions, for example, the flexibility in the
standard for relief should lead to industry-specific patterns because of
industry-specific differences in facts that are salient under the standard. 134
Burk and Lemley argue that this is where the solution to the problem of
uniformity costs lies—at least in patent law. In sum, they argue
(1) that a purely unitary patent system no longer fits the extraordinarily
diverse needs of innovators in today’s technology industries; (2) that the
solution is not to split the patent system into industry-specific statutes, but
to tailor the unitary patent rules on a case-by-case basis to the needs of

130 Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487–

88 (2004).
131 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 411–12 (2006).
132 One example of this form of tailoring is term extensions for individual patents.
See Richard M. Cooper, Esq., Legislative Patent Extensions, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 59,
59–62 (1993) (reviewing this practice in the nineteenth century).
133 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 110, at 1630–38 (arguing that courts should use
this flexibility to resolve patent crisis); see also R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path
Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341, 1345–48
(2003) (discussing this distinction).
134 See generally Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of
Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421 (2007) (explicating this
analysis); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Flexible Application of Injunctive Relief in Intellectual
Property Enforcement (with Reference to Lessons from the Emerging US Jurisprudence),
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (Edward Elgar, Xuan Li & Carlos M. Correa
eds., 2009).
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different industries; and (3) that it is the courts, not Congress or the PTO,
that are best positioned to do this tailoring. 135

Finally, after acknowledging that uniformity cost is real, and regardless
of weight given to the flexibility of standards, the proponent would further
defend uniform rights for the following reasons.

B. Administrative Cost
The uniform rights proponent, acknowledging difficulties in measuring
the total social costs of intellectual property rights, is likely to have an
intuitive sense that evidence of robust intellectual property licensing activity
combined with legal entrepreneurship to reduce transaction costs through
innovative licensing structures means that the magnitude of uniformity cost
is not significant enough to justify very much tailoring. Digging in a little
deeper, the proponent is likely to argue that broadly defined uniform rights
facilitate licensing and enforcement, and so the policy choice really is one
between tailoring through public or private ordering. On this view, the
intellectual property system is rendered more administrable through broadly
defined rights.
Some support for this point can be drawn from the work of Professors
Henry Smith and Clarisa Long, who independently focus on information cost
theory as relevant to the delineation of intellectual property rights.
Acknowledging the theoretical case in favor of rewards or perfectly tailored
rights, 136 Professor Smith argues that once administrative cost enters the
picture, broadly defined rights of exclusion perform better, rendering a
complex innovation system wieldy by limiting the information required by
officials entrusted to administer it. 137 Drawing from his work on real
property, Professor Smith argues that the law can deploy rights of
“exclusion” or rights of “governance” with respect to resources, and that
rights of exclusion create a modular system in which those who administer it
must only attend to boundaries and need not gather information necessary to

135 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 112, at 5.
136 Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements in

Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1748 (2007).
137 Id. at 1748, 1764 (“Like other property rights, intellectual property rights provide
simple ground rules as well as a platform for further contracting and for forming
organizations.”); see also id. at 1798 (“It may well be that as overall complexity increases
in the system of relations between actors using information, the modular feature of
property permits a greater degree of overall complexity than do legal regimes more
tailored to use.”).
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govern activities taking place within the boundaries. 138 This leads him to
assert that “[t]he central empirical question in both property and intellectual
property is when—and how easily—to overcome the basic presumption in
favor of exclusion.” 139
There are a number of problems with this framing, and explanation of
most of these are beyond the scope of this Article. 140 But it is useful to
acknowledge that included in the costs of transacting in or enforcing legal
rights are the cognitive tasks associated with conceiving the transaction or
the enforcement issue, and that broadly defined patents and copyrights may
well reduce licensing and enforcement costs under certain circumstances.
Along related lines, Professor Long argues that information goods have
information cost profiles facing observers and owners that the law shapes and
to which the law should attend. 141 For example, she acknowledges that
certain classes of patentable subject matter, such as business methods and
software, are qualitatively different from the paradigmatic inventions that
informed the structure of patent’s uniform rights, and she recognizes that
tailoring might reduce the information costs associated with transactions and
enforcement. 142 She nevertheless concludes her analysis with a lukewarm
defense of uniformity on the grounds that the trade-offs associated with
tailoring rights may not be cost-justified on information-cost grounds. 143
It is important to note that Professors Smith’s and Long’s respective
defenses of uniform intellectual property rights rely on a presumption based
on a view about comparative administrative costs. However, each of them
acknowledges that much turns on the evidence about the value of the
underlying innovation and the relative costs and benefits of tailoring. It is
likely that intuitions about how strong any presumptions in favor of
uniformity are likely to differ, but the framework in Section V sets forth

138 Id. at 1781–98.
139 Id. at 1818.
140 The largest problem stems from Professor Smith’s premise that the boundaries of

patented inventions or copyrighted works of authorship are ascertainable to observers,
owners or administrators in ways comparable to the boundaries of land or chattel
property. For a salient critique on additional grounds, see Michael A. Carrier, Why
Modularity Does Not (and Should Not) Explain Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 95 (2007), available at http://thepocketpart.org/2007/10/10/carrier.html;
see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 77, at 40–42; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the
Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1157, 1165–69, 1205–18 (2004).
141 See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV.
465, 466–71 (2004).
142 Id. at 546–47.
143 Id.

1398

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:6

standards for how and when such a presumption can be overcome on
administrability grounds.

1. Political Economy
Certain considerations of political economy counsel in favor of
uniformity as the default position for domestic policy. The strongest
argument is that domestic uniformity disciplines or increases the costs of rent
seeking by industries and other interest groups. Copyright and patent
legislation serves for some as a paradigm public-choice case because such
legislation generally is the product of bargaining among industry groups with
little or no consumer representation. 144 Commentators suggest that interest
group involvement in copyright and patent legislation has intensified in
recent years. 145
With uniform patents or copyrights, legislative change must submit to
what Tom Olson calls the “iron law of consensus,” 146 by which all industries
affected by the law must agree for an amendment to pass through the many
veto points in the legislative process. A recent example of the iron law in
action was the American Association of Photographers’ successful campaign
to torpedo an orphan works bill that had the support of the Copyright Office
and all the other traditional interest groups active in copyright
policymaking. 147
The argument then falls back. Even if a particular tailoring measure
would have improved the efficiency of copyright law, legislative practice that
would routinely grant additional rewards or create special carve-outs for
individual interest groups would intensify the problems of rent-seeking
already apparent in the process. 148
144 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 35–65 (2001) (describing history of copyright legislation in
the 20th century); William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal
Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996) (“In my experience, some
copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually resent members of Congress and staff interfering
with what they view as their legislation and their committee report.”).
145 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual
Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2234–36 (2000) (“There is abundant
evidence that lobbyists are focusing more efforts on IP issues, and that industries with
strong interest in IP issues are spending more.”).
146 Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to
Proposed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 109, 117 (1989).
147 ”Orphan Works” Bill Dies in Committee, National Press Photographers
Association, News and Events, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.nppa.org/news_and_events/
news/ 2006/09/orphan.html.
148 See, e.g., Long, Uniform Patent System, supra note 10, at 48–49.
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It is very important to note that the topic of geographic or international
uniformity should be kept quite distinct from the political economy argument
for uniform rights in domestic law. Evidence that would support the
discipline argument for domestic legislative policy does not equally support
the argument for international harmonization. On the contrary, the average
level of exclusion needed in any particular economy will vary in part on the
extent to which it is a net importer or exporter of goods or services
embodying protected information. 149 Thus, the push for international
harmonization, which imposes the same average level of exclusion and is
now encoded in the TRIPS agreement, is best understood as successful rent
seeking spearheaded by multinational rightsholding corporations
headquartered in the United States, Europe, and Japan.

2. Summary
The argument for designing intellectual property rights to apply
uniformly to all protected subject matter—after tailoring to distinguish
between patents and copyrights—and to apply uniformly to all rightsholders
recognizes that in theory the rights should be tailored to the specific needs of
specific innovators or tightly defined classes of innovator if granting
intellectual property rights were the only strategy available for addressing the
appropriability problem. The case for uniformity is grounded in pessimism
about the practical possibilities for achieving this ideal. The case comes as a
bad news/good news story.
The bad news is that designing rights in a tailored fashion is not feasible
because policymakers lack an evidentiary basis for tailoring, tailored rights
are more complex and not cost-justified on administrative grounds, uniform
rights impose political discipline on interest groups that would otherwise use
their influence in a tailoring-friendly environment to successfully seek even
greater rents than they currently receive.
The good news is first that the markets that intellectual property rights
enable have self-correcting features, such as: demand elasticity, price
discrimination, and Coasean bargaining. These features enable private
ordering to alter the initial design of intellectual property rights to better fit
particular circumstances. Second, to the extent that transaction costs limit the
scope of effective private ordering, some progress toward the theoretical
ideal of tailored rights can be made when rights are defined as formally
uniform while incorporating features that yield differential results in how the
rights actually function. These features are option filters and standards. 150
149 See Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property
Treaties, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 415, 425–30 (2004).
150 See supra Section III.A.2.
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An option filter requires that the potential rightholder take some action in
order to acquire or maintain protection under the right. 151 So-called copyright
“formalities,” patent examination, and patent maintenance fees all are such
option filters that cause rightholders to reveal private information in the
course of self-tailoring the effective reach of patents and copyrights. 152 In
addition, the legal standards that define the reach of patents and copyrights
require considerable contextual information to apply. As a consequence, the
incorporation of this contextual information causes administrators, courts,
licensing attorneys, and others who must apply the rights to do so with some
discernable differences across industries, technologies or classes of
rightholder in particular settings.

IV. TAILORED RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW
In a dynamic system, rules change in response to lessons rulemakers
learn about the effects of prior decisions. The economic analysis of
intellectual property law has thus far failed to supply a general information
feedback framework for assessing and adjusting regulation, by, for example,
tailoring the law. Indeed, the case for uniform intellectual property rights
must confront the law as it is—the numerous multilateral treaties that specify
minimum standards for patent and copyright law have tailored standards for
certain subject matter, Congress has tailored rights granted by patent and
copyright law in the United States along industry- or technology-specific
lines in a number of instances, and the federal courts and relevant
administrative agencies have further tailored the nominally uniform rights
granted by patent and copyright law to apply differently with respect to
certain kinds of invention and works of authorship. 153 The argument for
uniformity thus far developed acknowledges uniformity cost but reassures
that the combination of private ordering and judicious deployment of options
and standards has the matter well in hand. If that were true, however, what
explains the motivation of international and national policymakers to further
tailor patent and copyright law?
A definition is in order. Most lawyers think of tailoring as legislative
exceptions or alterations of general standards. But tailoring is not exclusively
a matter of amending legislation. Instead, intellectual property law can be,
and has been, tailored by (1) legislation, (2) judicial interpretation and
evidentiary presumptions, and (3) administrative rules, statutory
interpretation and adjudication. The point is important because judges and
151 See supra Section III.A.2.
152 See supra Section III.A.2.
153 See generally Carroll, Law of Tailoring, supra note 11 (describing tailored

patents and copyrights).
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agency officials do not always view their interpretive practices as having the
effect of tailoring the general standards of patent and copyright law, but in
practice they have and, as the framework in Section V infra suggests, they
should. In particular, the considerations of political economy within the
framework suggest that judicial tailoring is likely to be the most efficiencypromoting form of tailoring patent and copyright law.

A. Congress
Of course, tailoring rights by legislation is the most powerful form of
adaptation since the legislature is the source of these rights. A few examples
make the point. On the one hand, legislative tailoring in its most assertive
form disaggregates information from patent or copyright and designates it as
subject to sui generis rights. 154 On the other hand, legislative tailoring, such
as certain provisions of the Patent Act applicable to the term of patent for
certain pharmaceutical drugs, 155 is aimed at overcoming differential
treatment caused by regulatory approval processes and making uniform the
effective term of protection. 156
In addition, Congress has tailored patent law’s rights to exclude others
from making, selling, offering to sell, using, and importing an invention in
response to specific developments in certain industries. The provision with
the greatest economic significance probably is the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
immunity for a generic drug manufacturer’s use of a patented invention to
pursue regulatory approval for a drug to compete with a patented drug six
months prior to the patent’s expiration. 157 Also significant is the Bayh-Dole
Act, which permits grantees to pursue patent protection for inventions
created with the support of federal funds but limits scope by providing the
government with “march-in” rights. 158 This tailored measure is specifically
aimed at reducing uniformity cost. Federal grantees face differential
appropriability problems because the government has supplied both direct
financial support and exclusive rights to induce the investment. Congress also

154 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14 (creating sui generis protection for semiconductor

chip masks); see also Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 417, 438–44 (1985) (describing rationale for sui generis approach and legislative
process from participants’ perspective).
155 See 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2006).
156 See Lunney, supra note 6, at 47–48.
157 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006).
158 See id. §§ 200–12.
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has tailored the scope of process patents for medical method claims and
business method claims in response to perceived uniformity costs. 159
In the Copyright Act, Congress has tailored the scope of protection,
primarily by replacing the right to exclude with statutory licenses for certain
uses of certain classes of works. 160 Examples of these provisions include one
that tailors rights in musical works to permit garage bands and other
musicians the right to record cover versions of their favorite songs without
the songwriter’s permission. 161 Others tailor performance rights to permit
cable and satellite companies to retransmit network television programming
without prior consent of the copyright owners. 162 In addition, for certain
authors, such as recognized visual artists, Congress has granted additional
rights, 163 while for other classes of authors, such as architects 164 and authors
of sound recordings, 165 Congress has limited the exclusive rights available.
Similarly, Congress has limited the scope of rights in functional pictorial,
graphical, or sculptural works. 166 Congress also has tailored copyright scope
by identifying certain privileged users, primarily librarians, educators, and
Internet service providers, who enjoy certain additional limits on liability or
available remedies. 167 Recently, some commentators have remarked upon
how underanalyzed these features of copyright law have been. 168

159 See id. §§ 287(c) (medical methods), 273 (prior inventor defense).
160 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (2006) (cable retransmission license), 114 (2006)

(sound recording license); 115 (2006) (musical composition license), 119 (2006) (satellite
retransmission license).
161 See id. § 115.
162 See id. §§ 111, 119.
163 See id. § 106A.
164 See id. § 120 (limiting rights of owner of copyright in an architectural work).
165 See id. § 106(6) (limiting public performance right to performances by “digital
audio transmission”).
166 See 17 U.S.C. § 113 (2006).
167 See, e.g., id. §§ 110 (privileging certain users of copyrighted works), 504(c)(2)
(providing for remission of statutory damages for certain classes of users acting with a
good faith belief of fair use), 512 (creating safe harbor from monetary liability for online
service providers).
168 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 90 (2004);
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 366 (2005).
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B. The Federal Courts
Judicial tailoring is a built-in feature of intellectual property law. 169 As
described above, rights under patent and copyright have to be interpreted and
applied in context, and therefore the rights always are tailored for particular
subject matter to some degree. For purposes of this section, judicial tailoring
requires more systematic differentiation in the application or interpretation of
formally uniform rights. For example, copyright law treats books and source
code as literary works, which can be infringed by other works that are
“substantially similar” where there is evidence of copying. 170 But the scope
of how much expression the other work must borrow to fall within the zone
of substantial similarity is noticeably different between the two types of
literary work. 171
The effectiveness of judicial tailoring for making intellectual property
law more context-sensitive depends on the dimension of rights being
adapted. With regard to subject matter in copyright law, for example, courts
have a certain amount of discretion to determine whether a work is
sufficiently original 172 or to draw the line between an unprotected idea and
protected expression. Similarly, determining whether a process is
protectable 173 or whether a biological organism is a machine, a manufacture
or composition of matter 174 requires the exercise of interpretive discretion
through which the courts can tailor protection.
169 The role for judicial tailoring depends to some extent upon whether a legal
system adopts the principle of stare decisis. In those systems that do, the binding nature
of an appellate interpretation of a patent or copyright statute provides a court with a
greater ability to tailor rights prospectively.
170 See, e.g., Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing summary judgment standard for substantial similarity in suit for infringement
of children’s books by television series); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355–56
(9th Cir. 1990) (same in screenplay setting); Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992) (setting forth substantial similarity test for source code).
171 Compare Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362 (“a court applying the extrinsic test must
compare ‘the individual features of the works to find specific similarities between the
plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events’”) (citation
omitted), with Altai, 982 F.2d at 702–10 (applying abstraction-comparison-filtration
methodology to find no substantial similarity).
172 See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, The Copyrightability of New Works of Authorship:
“XML Schemas” as an Example, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 855, 861–73 (2001).
173 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding methods of doing business to be patentable processes).
174 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (five Justice
majority holding human-made bacteria not naturally occurring to be patentable subject
matter).
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As with subject matter, the scope doctrines under both patent and
copyright law delegate to courts substantial discretion that can be exercised
to tailor the balance of incentives and access for specific types of
information. For example, Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have
argued in a recent book built upon a prior series of articles that uniformity
cost is particularly high in relation to patent law’s application to software and
biotechnology and that these costs can be reduced by judicial tailoring of the
Patent Act. 175 They further assert that the Federal Circuit already has applied
the PHOSITA-based eligibility doctrines in technology-specific fashion to
software and biotechnology inventions. 176 They argue that the Federal
Circuit has not explicitly chosen to tailor patent law in this way, but that it
should. 177 Others, however, disagree with their reading of the cases. 178
Leaving aside who has the better of the descriptive argument, it is clear that
the flexible subject matter and scope standards described in Section III.A.2
confer sufficient discretion upon the courts to reduce uniformity cost by
fashioning rules or presumptions that apply to particular subject matter or
classes of innovator where necessary. With regard to duration, however, the
courts have little discretion to tailor the term of protection directly.
Nonetheless, some commentators have shown that courts can use their
discretion over scope to limit or enhance the effective duration of
protection. 179

C. The PTO and the Copyright Office
Administrative tailoring has been implemented to a limited degree.
Administrative tailoring has greater potential effect in patent law because
175 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 742 (2004) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology’s
Uncertainty Principle]; Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1630–38.
176 See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1593; Burk & Lemley,
Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, supra note 175, at 713–22.
177 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1194–95 (2002) (rejecting tailoring thesis as explanation for
technology-specific case law); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1675–
95 (proposing judicial tailoring for biotechnology, chemical-pharmaceutical, software,
and semiconductor inventions).
178 See R. Polk Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 367 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003); R. Polk
Wagner, Comment: Exactly Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749, 755–56 (2004).
179 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 799–800
(2003); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 409–10
(2002).
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protection does not commence until the PTO has issued a patent, and
tailoring can be accomplished during the examination process. As with
judicial tailoring, mere differential treatment—such as the issuance of patents
for obvious software inventions because of the absence of prior art—does not
amount to administrative policy to tailor the subject matter or scope of
protection to better balance incentives and access. The PTO also arguably
applies the Patent Act in tailored fashion. For example, evidence shows that
potential patentees in certain industries encounter more demanding
prosecution than others, and that this is a relatively recent development. 180
Indeed, the PTO=s examination guidelines for biotechnological inventions or
business method patents reflect a tailored interpretation of the requirements
of patentability. 181
In copyright law, Congress has delegated limited tailoring authority to
the Copyright Office. 182 For example, the Copyright Office’s determination
that the deposit requirement for source code should be altered to enable
copyright owners to enjoy both copyright and trade secret protection 183 is a
tailoring of copyright law’s disclosure function. The Copyright Office has
made the judgment that incentives are more important than access for
software and implemented that within the discretion granted by the
Copyright Act. 184
The fact that patent and copyright law have been tailored by all three
branches of government suggests that the case for uniform intellectual
property rights has some weaknesses. Why have these policymakers tailored
the law, and have these measures made the intellectual property strategy
more efficient? We can separate causes and effects. The cause for tailoring by
policymakers must be either a response to rent-seeking by special interest
groups, an ignorant but well-intentioned response to perceived uniformity
cost, or an informed response to real and substantial uniformity cost. The
effects of these measures must be one of the following: (1) tailoring has
increased the social costs of intellectual property rights by harming
180 See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1589–90 (collecting

sources).
181 See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1082 & n.263 (2003) (describing PTO initiative to give extra
scrutiny to applications for inventions with International Patent Classification 705).
182 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2006) (exempting classes of users
identified by Librarian of Congress through administrative rulemaking from
paracopyright prohibition in § 1201(a)(1)(A)).
183 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii) (2009); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS, CIRCULAR 61 2–3 (May 2005)
(differentiating deposit requirement to permit redaction of trade secret material).
184 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(c) (2006).
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incentives, reducing access or imposing additional administrative cost with
no offsetting benefit; (2) tailoring has not affected the social costs of
intellectual property rights because the tailored rights are of relatively little
economic significance or because the degree of tailoring is minor enough to
be immeasurable; or (3) tailoring has made the intellectual property strategy
more efficient by establishing a better fit between the appropriability
problem and its solution either by accident or by design.
The case for uniform intellectual property rights set forth thus far
predicts that the motive to tailor is most likely a response to rent-seeking, and
that the likely effects have been either to make matters worse or to be
relatively meaningless. Grudgingly, the argument for uniformity would make
room for the possibility that the government made the system more efficient
out of dumb luck. But, perhaps, policymakers in the dynamic intellectual
property system have made the law more efficient by responding to evidence
of uniformity cost. Analysts currently lack a framework for assessing existing
and proposed tailoring measures to ascertain their effects.

V. A FRAMEWORK FOR TAILORING
As the social costs of the intellectual property strategy have become
more visible, it is clear that tailoring intellectual property rights to reduce
uniformity cost is theoretically justified, and the means for tailoring are
available. Because tailoring intellectual property rights can be difficult and
costly, however, policymakers need a framework for analyzing when
tailoring will enhance social welfare. This framework applies prospectively
to pending and future legislative proposals and arguments for tailoring
through judicial or administrative statutory interpretation and retrospectively
to audit the tailoring statutory provisions or interpretations in existing patent
and copyright law.
This framework operates at a high level of generality, with the aim of
focusing attention on the relevant types of evidence and argument that
deserve attention regardless of the institutional setting for the tailoring
analysis. This framework requires that three conditions be met for tailoring to
be successful. First, the “knowledge corollary” to the ignorance justification
for intellectual property rights must be satisfied. Policymakers must have
sufficiently reliable information about eliminable uniformity costs. It is likely
that tailoring will have to be done on an industry-specific or technologyspecific basis. 185 Second, any measures to tailor intellectual property rights
185 See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 818 (“Since the
impact of legal protection of intellectual property depends on the strength of other
appropriability mechanisms and varies widely among industries, focused efforts to solve
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so as to eliminate such uniformity costs should be administratively feasible
and cost-effective—i.e., “administrable”. Finally, considerations of political
economy should influence the final design of any tailoring proposal with
respect to its institutional form.
One goal of this framework is to separate the process of identifying
inefficiencies in the operation of the intellectual property system from
fashioning solutions. The first step in this analysis focuses on the kinds of
economic evidence relevant for measuring the performance of the system.
The second and third steps focus on high-level considerations necessary to
fashioning a workable tailored solution to problems identified in the first
step. However, this framework does not purport to be complete. In particular,
further work is needed to analyze the relative information gathering and
processing capacities of Congress, agencies and the courts concerning the
operation of innovation and cultural policy. Similarly, further comparative
analysis is needed to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of each
branch of government’s capacity to tailor intellectual property rights, taking
into account a realistic understanding of the policy process. Finally, future
work should also examine potential inter-branch collaboration to produce
tailored solutions. For example, if courts lack access to legislative facts but
have the greatest resistance to rent seekers, a revived Office of Technology
Assessment in the executive branch might produce relatively unbiased
reports that could inform judicial interpretation of patent and copyright law
to take account of relevant industry-specific or technology-specific
differences. I hope to wrestle with these issues in future work.

A. Substantial Evidence of Uniformity Cost
To satisfy the knowledge corollary, what kinds and how much evidence
must a tailoring proponent adduce? The answer is that it depends upon the
nature of the tailoring proposal and the degree of change for which it calls.
This discussion assumes that tailoring proponents take a dynamic view of
innovation and creativity, and that any proposal would be based on basic
knowledge of the relevant rate and direction of activity in the innovative or
creative fields that would be affected by the proposal, and that responsible
tailoring proponents would acknowledge their level of uncertainty and
anticipate the need for further adjustments through devices such as legislative
sunsets or periodic review and reports by administrative agencies.
Under this framework, the tailoring proponent’s burden increases in
rough proportion to the degree that a proposal calls for disaggregation of
rights. However, it is important not to overstate error costs. Recall that the
problems in specific markets would be more prudent than a broad attempt to upgrade
protection.”).
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existing baselines in patent and copyright law rest on a great deal of
uncertainty. Unless those likely to be affected by a tailoring measure can
predict its impact on expected value with some certainty and predict that the
effect will be different than the proponent claims, the risk of error associated
with a tailoring proposal is not likely to be substantial. 186
Consequently, for a proponent to establish a prima facie case that
tailoring is appropriate under the first element within this framework, the
proponent need only adduce substantial evidence of identifiable uniformity
cost. The substantial evidence standard is well established under the
Administrative Procedure Act as evidence of a quantity and quality that “a
‘reasonable mind might accept’ a particular evidentiary record as ‘adequate
to support a conclusion.’” 187 The quality and quantity of this evidence also
will be relevant when assessing whether any added costs associated with
administering tailored rights are justified, but these matters should be kept
analytically distinct. Before we know when to tailor or whether existing
tailoring promotes efficiency, we need a better idea for the kinds of evidence
likely to support a particular case for tailoring. This subsection suggests the
kinds of evidence likely to support a tailoring argument. The strength of that
support varies with the scope of the proposal.

1. Innovator Incentives—When Rights Are Wrong
The premise underlying patent and copyright law—that creators or
innovators must be able to exclude others in order to extract benefits from
them to compensate for the costs of creation or innovation 188 —is
demonstrably untrue in some cases. Innovative activity appears to have many
complicated motivations, and society may receive the benefits of certain
forms of innovation even without extending rights sufficient to induce a
rational, selfish actor to innovate. 189 Moreover, even when one holds firm to
186 I thank Michael Abramowicz for this point.
187 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999).
188 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property

Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement]
(“In a private market economy, individuals will not invest in invention or creation
unless . . . they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.”). Some
cultural innovators have been candid about their pecuniary motivations to create. See,
e.g., TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE 18 (1998) (citing comments by
Mozart and Charlie Chaplin among others).
189 See, e.g., TERESA M. AMABILE, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 14–15
(1983); TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 153–77 (1996); Bruno S. Frey &
Reto Jegan, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589 (2001) (reviewing
evidence that intrinsic motivation can be reduced by prospect of external reward); see
also Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.

2009]

ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL

1409

the rational actor thesis, in some cases anticipated prestige, notoriety or other
“nonpecuniary income” would serve as a sufficient return on the investment
to induce initial production in the absence of copyright or patent. 190
Alternatively, the investment in initial production may serve as a loss leader
to increase other revenue streams, such as speaker’s fees. 191 Finally, firms in
a competitive economy are under constant pressure to innovate to
differentiate their products and services from their competitors even without
the promise of exclusive rights. 192
What are the types of patentable or copyrightable information that might
get produced in sufficient quantity that rights could be tailored to exclude
these classes from protectible subject matter or reduce the scope of rights? At
this stage the bounds of the group can be stated intuitively, although research
could improve this knowledge. The explosion of so-called “user generated
content” on the Internet calls into question the premise that exclusive rights
must be dangled as a lure to creation. Similarly, scholars and researchers do
not receive royalties for their journal articles, and it is likely that they would
continue to research and to write even without copyright in their articles
because they receive direct compensation to do research and there are a
variety of indirect benefits that flow from publication. 193 In the world of
patents, there’s a real question about whether the recent extension of patent
rights to business methods was necessary on incentive grounds. 194
Using this kind of evidence to support a tailoring proposal may be
difficult, however. One complication for the next stage of the analysis—
administrability—is that there may be no feasible way to differentiate
1151, 1198–1204 (2007) (proposing a decentered model of creativity derived in part from
empirical studies of creative processes and showing how copyright law could be
judicially tailored in the context of narrative retellings).
190 See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 110, at 1586 (describing
alternative incentives to innovate).
191 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 333 (1989) (describing forms of non-pecuniary
income authors derive from publication).
192 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust
Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 590–92 (2007) (reviewing longstanding
debate about how much incentive competition provides to innovate and situating antitrust
law within this debate).
193 See, e.g., Howard P. Tuckman & Jack Leahy, What Is an Article Worth?, 83 J.
POL. ECON. 951, 951–52 (1975) (making the classic argument about indirect
compensation from scholarship). Of course, copyright also stimulates investments in
journal publication, and so any tailoring measure would have to take these incentives into
account as well.
194 See Michael Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 309, 322–27 (2002).
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between those who would have created or innovated in a particular field
without the promise of exclusive rights and those who require such a
promise. Compare and contrast for example, the numerous musicians who
would compose and perform in a world without copyright with those creators
driven by the thought of riches and fame underwritten by copyright. 195
Similarly, consider those free and open source software programmers
motivated by nonpecuniary factors—and these are not all such
programmers—and those who rely on a proprietary strategy as their
motivation. 196 With this kind of evidence of uniformity cost, the solution
may be to place an option filter on otherwise uniform rights rather than seek
to differentiate legislatively or judicially. Alternatively, policymakers could
tailor the real options to apply only to certain classes of work.

2. Alternative Appropriability Mechanisms
Even for those creators and innovators who seek control over others’ use
of their creations and innovations as a means of extracting compensation,
patents and copyrights usually supplement a range of other tools or
strategies. Evidence that these other tools are particularly effective or
ineffective in light of relevant cost structures would tend to show that
uniform intellectual property rights are misaligned. In particular, evidence
related to the following alternative mechanisms is likely to be highly
probative.

a. Direct Cost Subsidies
Although granting exclusive rights remains the dominant policy tool, the
government also directly and indirectly subsidizes some forms of information
production through grants, rewards, and tax incentives. 197 In the United
195 Cf. Susana Juniu, Ted Tedrick & Rosangela Boyd, Leisure or Work?: Amateur

and Professional Musicians’ Perception of Rehearsal and Performance, 28 J. LEISURE
RES. 44, 44 (1996) (finding marked differences between amateur and professional
musicians toward rehearsal).
196 See, e.g., Jürgen Bitzer, Wolfram Schrettl & Philipp J. H. Schröder, Intrinsic
Motivation in Open Source Software Development, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 160, 160–61
(2007); Joshua Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J.
INDUS. ECON. 197, 197–99 (2002).
197 Tax incentives can be used to spur investments in certain types of innovation—
e.g., development of uses for solar energy—or as an add-on incentive to existing
intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Jacek Warda, Tax Treatment of Business
Investments in Intellectual Assets: An International Comparison 13–19 (OECD
Directorate of Sci. Tech. and Industry, Working Paper No. 2006/4, 2006) (cataloging tax
incentives for R&D investments), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
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States, the federal government funds approximately 25% of research and
development, and in OECD countries, public sector investment approaches
50%. 198 Because the standard model recognizes that optimal protection must
trade off solutions to the underproduction and underutilization problems,
where the underproduction problem is solved through direct or indirect
government investment, the level of protection should decrease to minimize
deadweight losses from underutilization. 199 Federal funding agencies have
come under some pressure along these lines after some results show that
these agencies did little to condition the use of patents arising from publicly
financed research. 200
The Bayh-Dole amendments to the Patent Act 201 are the clearest signal
that policymakers are at least nominally responsive to evidence-based
arguments concerning the effects of direct subsidies. Prior to 1980, federal
grantees—primarily universities and research centers—faced uncertainty
about seeking patent protection for inventions discovered under the auspices
of a federal grant. 202 Responding to arguments that commercializers lacked
sufficient incentives to build on unpatented discoveries made by federal
grantees, Congress made clear that these grantees could seek and receive
patent protection subject to some tailoring of scope to reduce the social costs
of monopoly under particular conditions. 203

53/4/36764076.pdf.
198 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1530–31.
199 For an argument to this effect with respect to publicly financed biotechnology
research, see Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290–91 (2003); see also John M. Golden,
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in
the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 109 (2001) (arguing that patent analysts often
overlook the role of multibillion-dollar public investments in research in biotechnology
industry).
200 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER NIH–
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAXOL, REPORT TO THE
HONORABLE RON WYDEN, U.S. SENATE 3 (June 2003) (finding that “NIH made
substantial investments in research related to [cancer drug] Taxol, but its financial
benefits from the collaboration with BMS [Bristol Meyers Squibb] have not been great in
comparison to BMS’s revenue from the drug.”).
201 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006).
202 See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 199, at 303–04 (describing situation in 1980).
203 See id. at 304. The story Congress heard was that universities cared only about
scientific recognition and were indifferent to patents, that private industry needed exclusive
rights under university-owned patents to make product development profitable, and that
government funding agencies had to be restrained from indulging their anti-patent reflexes so
that universities and private industry could join forces to develop new technologies for the
benefit of the U.S. economy. Id.
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In response to these developments, the patent literature has seen the
emergence of two related cottage industries. One is specifically focused on
proposals to revise Bayh-Dole, 204 and the other embraces a range of related
proposals to tailor patent law for universities. 205 The argument here is that
the fact of direct subsidies is the kind of evidence likely to give rise to
substantial uniformity cost because baseline patent rights are premised on an
assumption that innovators need to recoup most of their costs in the market
through the promise of monopoly pricing. 206
The focus of debate about university patenting should be on the source of
uniformity cost. In what ways do the direct subsidies supply sufficient
incentives for innovation? Are there gaps? If so, where? If the premise of
Bayh-Dole is correct, would it be more effective to tailor the law to provide a
limited commercialization right rather than patents to directly subsidized
inventors? These are the kinds of economic analyses that the uniformity cost
perspective suggests will most usefully inform debates about patenting by
federally funded researchers inside and outside of the university setting.
The other form of direct subsidy that should be squared with uniform
intellectual property rights is prizes and rewards. As discussed above, direct
204 See, e.g., DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL
INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT 166 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and
University Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary D. Libecap ed.,
2005); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1665–71
(1996); F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 692
(2001); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the
Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1412 (2007); Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation
System Laboratories: California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1133, 1136 (2006) (characterizing Bayh-Dole as controversial); Rai & Eisenberg,
supra note 199, at 289–91; Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual
Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 147–51 (1999).
205 See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights:
Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 217 (2006); Ron A.
Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of Publicly
Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?,
13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 125–26 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent
Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 622–24 (2008) (“The need
for university patents, in short, depends critically on the technology at issue”); Kristen
Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities Should Take a Lesson from
Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV. 407, 408–11 (2007); Elizabeth A.
Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve
Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 942–44 (2006).
206 See, e.g., Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 1476–77.
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compensation in the form of prizes or rewards is a well-established policy
option. 207 Many of the modern implementations of this option, however, use
it as a supplement rather than a substitute for intellectual property protection.
Should the government respond to the challenges of climate change by
offering a $300 million prize for an improved car battery that will reduce
carbon emissions, as presidential candidate John McCain proposed during
the 2008 election season? 208 Under the uniformity cost approach, one would
ask what the evidence is that fluctuating fuel prices and other competitive
circumstances do not already suggest that the value of a patent on such an
invention would be sufficient to induce sufficient investments in this
direction. 209
This is not to say that prizes or rewards should never be used as
supplements to patent and copyright protection. The uniformity cost
perspective suggests that this approach makes sense if uniform rights are
insufficiently robust to attract certain types of creative or innovative activity.
One caution, however, is that policymakers should also experiment with
using prizes and rewards as substitutes for exclusive rights to ensure that they
are not overcompensating innovators and creators. As a middle ground,
policymakers might permit winners to pursue or to retain intellectual
property rights but might either require that the government receive a license
to use and to sublicense or require the winner to agree to pursue open
licensing. 210
207 See supra Section II (discussing policy of using prizes and rewards as
compensation for intellectual property rights).
208 Michael Cooper, McCain Proposes a $300 Million Prize for a Next-Generation
Car Battery, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2008, at A20.
209 See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Electro-Shock Therapy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
July/Aug. 2008, at 84 (describing General Motors’s aggressive approach to producing a
battery-powered hybrid in response to eroding market share).
210 A recent report by the National Research Council recommends that the National
Science Foundation increase the number of innovation prize funds it administers, tailored
to particular innovations, and that its policy toward intellectual property should be:

We recommend that the federal government not seek to own or control the
disposition of intellectual property developed by contestants in the course of seeking
NSF innovation inducement prizes, with one exception. The exception would be that
if the winner of a prize chooses not to put the winning innovation into commercial
practice within a reasonable time period and if it declines to license it to another
U.S.-based entity wishing to commercialize the invention, the winner would be
required, as a condition of the award, to enter into good faith negotiations with the
other party for a license to be awarded under terms and conditions typical for the
industry or technology sector.

INNOVATION INDUCEMENT PRIZES AT THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION: COMMITTEE
ON THE DESIGN OF AN NSF INNOVATION PRIZE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 33 (2007).
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b. Industry- or Market-Specific Features
Lead time advantage and network effects are two market-specific
economic phenomena that affect appropriability and innovator incentives and
would therefore independently provide evidence relevant to a tailoring
proposal.

i. Lead Time
Leadtime or first-mover advantage is the most common market-specific
appropriability feature that could be the basis for tailoring. For at least some
period of time, information will be excludable where its creation is
unobserved and when the information has not been otherwise
communicated. 211 If the producer invests in information security procedures
and measures, he or she can capitalize on this limited-duration excludability
by being first to market with the goods incorporating the valuable
information. 212 During the lead time, then, the producer will be the sole
source of the information good and will be able to charge supracompetitive
prices before competitors acquire the good, reproduce it and enter the market
with cheaper alternatives. 213 Research indicates that the value of lead time
often is industry-specific, 214 and that in product markets with patentable
goods incumbents often enjoy significant market share advantages even after
competitors have entered a market. 215
The value of the lead-time advantage is affected not only by its duration
but also by competitors’ copying costs. The competitor does not bear the
211 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
PATENT STATISTICS MANUAL 21–22 (2009).
212 Trade secret law is concerned with keeping valuable information excludable
where the producer does not to seek to sell the information directly. See, e.g., Jerome. H.
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2432, 2520–21 (1994).
213 See Frischmann, Spillovers Theory, supra note 59, at 369 (“Lead time advantage
is primarily dependent on secrecy, timing, and the ease of copying or reverse
engineering.”).
214 See generally William T. Robinson et al., First-mover Advantages from
Pioneering New Markets: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 1 (1994)
(surveying literature showing first-mover advantages, including industry-specific results).
Of course, it is not an ironclad rule that being first is always best. See generally Marvin
B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover (Dis)Advantages: Retrospective and
Link with the Resource-Based View, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1111 (1998) (summarizing
literature on relative first mover advantages).
215 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1251, 1257 n.18 (2004).
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costs of initial production, such as the time and effort to write a novel, and
should therefore have marginally lower costs. The margin may not be that
great where the competitor faces fixed costs of its own, such as the costs of
rekeying a manuscript, or manufacturing and marketing competing goods.
One study shows that imitation costs for patentable goods can run about 65%
of the costs of innovation. 216 However, about 70% of the goods studied were
patented and “imitation costs” included the costs of inventing around the
patent. 217 Consequently, this data does not translate immediately into the
costs of competition in markets without intellectual property rights.
Additionally, when one accounts for the monetary value of time, reflected as
a competitor’s opportunity costs, the necessary level of protection would be
further reduced. If expected profits derived from this lead-time or first-mover
advantage are sufficient to recoup the costs of initial production, the case for
government intervention largely disappears. 218
However, evidence that the prospect of lead time profits provides
sufficient incentives for creation or innovation is not by itself evidence of
uniformity cost. Even in cases in which granting intellectual property rights
is unnecessary because lead time supplies the right incentive, the rights
would be merely superfluous and the social harm from uniformity would be
negligible since this class of creator or innovator would enjoy market power
even without the rights. 219 Consequently, a tailoring proponent would need
to further investigate evidence of lead time profits to determine whether
exclusive rights effectively layer on an additional margin unnecessary to
stimulate the desired levels of investment. The best case for tailoring based
on lead time profits would be one in which intellectual property rights should
be treated as superfluous on both sides of the ledger, but rightsholders use the
rights to engage in strategic litigation that squeezes additional rents from
competitors and consumers with no offsetting social benefits. 220

216 Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91

ECON. J. 907, 909–10 (1981).
217 See id.
218 See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2504–05 (1994). One commercial publisher has
decided to rely solely on its lead-time advantage for its line of books directed at open
source programmers. See Steve Lohr, Steal This Book? A Publisher Is Making It Easy,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at C4.
219 Thanks to Michael Abramowicz for helping to sharpen this point in an email
exchange.
220 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 77, at 130–38 (tallying the costs of patent
litigation and the chilling effect that the risk of incurring such costs has on innovation).
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ii. Network Effects
A second market-based feature that might justify tailoring is the presence
of strong network effects. A tailoring proponent relying on evidence of
network effects would likely argue that a producer in a market with network
externalities may have a number of ways to recoup the costs of initial
production even in the absence of exclusive rights. 221 As a general matter,
these are effects that alter (usually increase) the value of a purchased good or
service because others have chosen to purchase or use the same good or
service. The classic example is the telephone. It becomes more valuable as
others acquire them. Economists distinguish between markets involving
actual networks, virtual networks, and positive feedback effects, and these
distinctions could impact the strength of a tailoring proposal. 222
Evidence of network externalities may support shift from a property to a
liability rule to provide a form of rate-of-return regulation of a “natural”
monopoly. 223 Unauthorized copying can serve to strengthen the market share
of an information provider in a “tippy” market. 224 Even where network
effects are not strong enough to induce a desired level of investment in
information production, network effects can amplify the market power that
exclusive rights can confer. 225 Professors Lemley and McGowan suggest that
221 Network effects, as manifested by the “superstar” effect is a version of the

phenomenon. See, e.g., Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 845, 845 (1981). Although Rosen explains the skew distribution of popularity in the
cultural sphere as reflecting a skewed distribution of talent in the population, id. at 846, a
more convincing account would focus on the signaling function that certain forms of
consumption play. Once momentum builds behind a particular book, movie, song,
entertainer, athlete, or fashion design, consumers’ purchasing decisions will be
influenced more by the importance of signaling membership in the herd than by any
subjective evaluation of the good’s quality. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILLIP J.
COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE FEW AT THE TOP GET SO MUCH MORE
THAN THE REST OF US (1995).
222 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488 (1998).
223 Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 836 (2007).
224 See VARIAN & SHAPIRO, supra note 120, at 45; Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare
Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of
Demand Network Externalities, 42 J. INDUS. ECON. 155, 165 (1994) (“Once the networkenhancing effect of the copies is taken into account, not only can copying lead to greater
firm profits, it can produce a Pareto improvement in social welfare, despite the absence of
indirect appropriation.”).
225 See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 188, at 1066–67 (stating
that intellectual property rights reinforce market power where there are strong
standardization effects).
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evidence of a market exhibiting strong network effects because of demand
for standardization may support proposals to permit reverse engineering to
allow competitive entry. 226 Patent law currently does not recognize a reverse
engineering defense, although some scholars have offered proposals either
for a generalized fair use defense that could be adapted to market
circumstances 227 or more tailored proposals to permit reverse engineering.
Evidence of strong network effects pose one particular challenge to
tailoring proponents, however. If network effects, coupled with exclusive
rights confer substantial market power, is tailoring intellectual property rights
superior to policing abuses of such market power through competition law?
The answer to this question is difficult because antitrust doctrine is in flux. A
number of scholars have advanced arguments about the appropriate
relationship between intellectual property and antitrust, 228 but further
discussion of that intersection is beyond the scope of this Article. In any
event, a tailoring proponent would have to account for the role of antitrust in
network markets, and, if the law were to move in the direction some of these
theories suggest, it may be more efficient to leave uniform intellectual
property rights in tact and to adapt their actual reach through judicial
application coupled with enforcement under competition law.

3. Overlapping Rules and Rights
Two common legal features that intellectual property owners factor into
their appropriability calculus is the availability of other legal rights of
exclusion, such as trade secret, trademark, or contract law, and regulatory
requirements in the marketing and distribution of creations or innovations.
Patent and copyright law already have been tailored to respond to these
features in some respects. For example, with respect to overlapping rights,
Professor Jerry Reichman has pointed out, trade secret law provides a
liability-rule substrate to the property-rule regimes of patent and
copyright. 229
As important, product differentiation strategies supported by trademark
law supply an important source of power over price. The effects of trademark
and trade secret protection may be sufficient to induce the desired level of
226 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 222, at 525, 527.
227 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100

COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1249–50 (2000); see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne
Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1638
(2002).
228 See Baker, supra note 192, at 575 (collecting sources).
229 See Reichman, supra note 218, at 2438–41 (explaining liability rule structure of
trade secret law).
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investment even in the absence of copyright or patent rights in some
cases. 230 Moreover, the exclusivity provided by copyright or patent rights
facilitates the producer’s ability to establish strong, highly distinctive
marks. 231 This effect likely explains why consumers continue to purchase
branded over-the-counter drugs such as Tylenol® or Advil® at a significant
premium even when they have available cheaper generic drugs that are
chemically perfect substitutes. 232 In markets in which this effect is
particularly strong, the level of protection may be reduced by, for example,
reducing the term of protection without significantly reducing the incentive
effects the protection supplies. One might similarly analyze the presence or
absence of effective technological controls that perfect excludability in the
absence of exclusive rights. 233
In addition to overlapping rights, the pharmaceutical industry faces
overlapping regulation because to take a patented medicine to market, a firm
must satisfy health and safety standards as well as the standard for
patentability. 234 The health and safety regulatory process diminishes the
effective period of market exclusivity offered by the patent. 235 Patent law
already has been tailored in response in two ways. The term of patent
protection can be extended based on regulatory delay, 236 but also generic
entry at the end of patent protection has been facilitated by Hatch-

230 See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property and Intellectual Property: An

Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY
L.J. 327, 432–34 (2006) (arguing that trademark, and to a lesser extent patent, could
provide entertainment industry sufficient incentives even without copyright).
231 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2002) (“Those who actually use
intellectual property protection, however, appreciate that its various modalities can be
combined to yield important synergies: Patents can help create goodwill, and trademarks
can be used to appropriate the gains from innovation.”).
232 Robert Barsky, Mark E. Bergen, Shantanu Dutta & Daniel Levy, What Can the
Price Gap Between Branded and Private-Label Products Tell Us About Markups?, in
SCANNER DATA AND PRICE INDEXES 165, 218–22 (Robert Feenstra & Matthew Shapiro
eds., 2003) (showing that branded analgesics enjoy a high markup over generic
competitors).
233 Such an analysis is complicated by the presence of exclusive rights in the use of
access and copy controls. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
234 See supra note 27.
235 Outlook 2009, TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., OUTLOOK 2009 1 (Jan.
2009) (reporting that regulatory approval for new drugs averaged 1.1 years during 2005–
2007 but that combined approval and clinical phase time was about 8 years), available at
http://csdd.tufts.edu/InfoServices/OutlookPDFs/ Outlook2009.pdf.
236 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155–56 (2006).
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Waxman. 237 The pharmaceutical industry has deployed two strategies to
extend the period of monopoly on a patented medicine. First, it has chosen to
appropriate the limited exclusive right that the law offers to first-moving
generic manufacturers. 238 Second, it has sought and obtained a new exclusive
right on the clinical trial data necessary for regulatory approval of generic
equivalents of patented medicines. This tailored right of “data exclusivity”
has been written into bilateral “free trade” agreements between the United
States and a number of trading partners, and in the European Union. 239

4. Fragmentation and Market Failure
The flipside of overlapping rights are rights that are too finely grained to
support the innovative investments or activities in a particular industry or
context. In such cases, problems of anticommons may emerge. Tailoring
proponents may propose measures that consolidate rights, increase
limitations or exceptions to the rights, or tailor remedies to offer only liability
rule protection of the rights.

5. Demand-Side Features—Positive Spillovers
Even if uniform rights suited information producers to a tee, a good
argument for tailoring rights could be derived from evidence of certain
positive externalities, or spillovers, on the demand side. Professors Brett
Frischmann and Mark Lemley argue separately and together that efficient
patent and copyright law must be limited and leaky in order to encourage or
allow certain types of uncompensated demand-side sharing of valuable
information. 240 Their arguments call for tailoring to ensure that the law is
particularly permissive with respect to patented or copyrighted information
that functions as “infrastructure.” 241 In particular, Frischmann argues that

237 See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005)

(describing purpose of Hatch Waxman Act, as amended).
238 See id. at 1058 (vacating FTC order finding such a settlement to be anticompetitive).
239 See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on
Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. OF WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399, 401 (2006), available at
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S0042-96862006000500021&script=sci_
arttext&tlng=en.
240 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 922–23 (2005) [hereinafter Frischmann, Economic
Theory]; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 66, at 257, 282.
241 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 66, at 271.
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information should be managed as a commons rather than through private,
exclusive rights when:
(1) The resource may be consumed nonrivalrously; (2) Social demand for
the resource is driven primarily by downstream productive activity that
requires the resource as an input; and (3) The resource may be used as an
input into a wide range of goods and services, including private goods,
public goods, and nonmarket goods. 242

Patent and copyright law already reflect this view, in part, through
general exclusions of protection for ideas or facts (in the case of copyright)
or discoveries of products of nature (in the case of patent). 243 But some
information that would fall within the subject matters of patent and
copyright, respectively, also may function as nonrivalrous, generic inputs
that supply social and public goods, such as public health or public
education, for which markets are either absent or incomplete. In such cases,
“the opportunity cost of an exclusive right may be greater than its
benefit.” 244 In these cases, the argument for solving the appropriability
problem through some combination of prize, reward, or tax strategy is likely
to be particularly strong.
Alternatively, where the evidence shows that patented or copyrighted
information serves as an input to a range of private and public goods, a
tailoring proponent may seek to propose limitations or exceptions for the
producers of public goods while leaving exclusive rights intact as against the
producers of private goods. Much of the recent commentary calling for a
revitalized experimental use exception to patent infringement or for tailoring
of patent law with respect to university researchers follows this line. 245 The
proponent should also be prepared to answer the argument advanced by
Professor Polk Wagner that even “complete” rights of exclusion are unable to
prevent positive spillovers, and—to the extent that more robust, uniform
rights encourage production of additional information—the total amount of
spillovers will increase with broad exclusive rights. 246 In my own view, even

242 See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 240, at 956.
243 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004) (excluding ideas from subject matter of

copyright).
244 Lawrence Lessig, Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1031, 1035 (2005) (recasting Frischmann’s argument).
245 See, e.g., Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement:
Information on Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483, 523–40 (2006) (collecting
sources and summarizing range of law reform proposals for experimental use).
246 See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and
the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 995 (2003).
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setting aside distributional concerns, I am skeptical about the degree to which
increases in a rightsholder’s power of exclusion beyond a certain point
induce increased production and distribution of useful information, but the
tailoring proponent should be prepared with a more detailed argument along
these lines.

6. Industrial Innovation Decision Structures
Economic analysis to date suggests that the magnitude of appropriability
problems varies by industry, 247 and we would therefore expect that tailoring
proposals are likely to call for line drawing along industry lines. In prior
work, Professors Robert Merges, Richard Nelson, 248 and Professor Tim
Wu 249 independently suggest that policymakers should recognize the effect
on industry structure and degree of competitive entry influenced by the
subject matter and scope of intellectual property rights and that policymakers
should tailor rights to modulate the degree of entry depending upon industry
maturity and other competitive conditions.
Merges and Nelson made a significant contribution to the patent
literature first by calling attention to the role courts must play in tailoring the
scope of patents through application of the law’s flexible scope doctrines and
second by “show[ing] that the issues at stake regarding patent scope depend
on the nature of technology in an industry. This dependence includes two
characteristics: the relationship between technical advances in the industry,
and the extent to which firms license technologies to each other.” 250
By studying and categorizing the effects of patent scope on follow-on
invention, Merges and Nelson generally reject the “prospect” theory of patent
scope that would delegate control over follow-on innovation to early
inventors in favor of greater entry tailored to the characteristics of what they
label “cumulative technologies,” “chemical industries,” and “science-based
industries.” 251 They argue that the PTO and courts should be attentive to the
dynamic development of technology within specific industries or fields of
invention and recognize that their respective decisions about patent scope
also have dynamic effects.
Professor Wu makes a related argument concerning the role that the
presence or absence of intellectual property rights and the delineation of their

247 See supra Section V.A.2.b. (discussing industry-specific appropriability
problems).
248 See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 115.
249 See generally Wu, supra note 65.
250 Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 843.
251 See id. at 908–16 (summarizing conclusions).
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scope will shape the “decision architecture” for innovation within particular
industries. In short, he argues that where intellectual property rights are
robust, innovation decisions are likely to be made within hierarchal firms that
own these rights, and the willingness of these firms to grant licenses to
follow-on innovators who may become competitors is suspect. 252 In contrast,
where intellectual property rights are subject to significant limitations or
exceptions, innovation decisions are likely to be made polyarchically. 253 He
argues that policymakers should employ presumptions that favor limited
intellectual property rights in new industries to favor decentralized
development unless the risk of misappropriation is so significant that
investments in new development will be deterred. 254 In contrast, he argues
that policymakers should be more solicitous of claims for more robust rights
applicable to “dead” industries unless overpropertization was one of the
causes of death. 255
The take-away from this work is that policymakers should be receptive
to tailoring arguments that rely on industry-wide evidence concerning the
effects of intellectual property rights on the pace and direction of innovation.
This evidence and the decisions that it supports will be most significant when
an industry of field or endeavor is in its early stages. Professors Merges and
Nelson stress the importance of rewarding pioneers with relatively broad
patents, but they and Professor Wu also show that the PTO, the Federal
Circuit, and Congress should guard against overreaching by early innovators
who are likely to use the control that robust intellectual property rights confer
to choke off socially beneficial follow-on innovators.

7. Summary and Examples
Decisions about intellectual property policy should be evidence-based.
Judge Posner is correct to say that gathering and assessing evidence about the
performance of uniform patents and copyrights is difficult. But gathering and
assessing evidence about the social costs of uniform rights and how these
could be tailored to perform better is far more plausible and effective. This
should be a primary focus for the economic analysis of intellectual property.
The types of evidence most likely to support a tailoring proposal are those
showing innovator incentives that depart from the standard rationale for
252 Wu, supra note 65, at 140–41.
253 See id. at 143–45 (“The analysis here suggests that copyright and patent

exceptions have a particular urgency when they can open markets to decentralized
improvement without permitting misappropriation of the primary owners’ investments.”).
Id. at 145.
254 See id. at 145.
255 See id. at 146–47.
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intellectual property rights, the availability of alternative appropriability
mechanisms, the role of overlapping legal rights that influence
appropriability, the magnitude of positive spillovers generated by certain
types of innovative activity, and industry-specific effects on follow-on
innovation from uniform rights.
A few recent examples of tailoring debates highlight the relevance of this
evidentiary taxonomy. The availability of alternative appropriability
mechanisms, lead time in particular, is the focus of a current policy debate
concerning fashion design. A group of fashion designers have petitioned
Congress for a sui generis three-year right of exclusivity on the grounds that
globalized markets and the Internet have eroded the designer’s traditional
lead-time advantage. 256 They assert that factories in India use photographs
taken when new lines of clothing are first displayed and have knock-offs in
the stores before the designers have even shipped their own lines. 257 Some
members of Congress agreed to introduce legislation creating a sui generis
right for apparel, bags, belts, and eyeglass frames.
Evidence of erosion of lead time is not by itself sufficient evidence to
support a tailored measure of this sort. Proponents must provide evidence
that the erosion of lead time reduces investment incentives below desired
levels. Critics of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act argue that successful
designers still enjoy sufficient rewards to provide sufficient incentives to
create and that the social costs of the proposed expansion of intellectual
property rights would mire the industry in socially wasteful litigation without
any offsetting benefits in “better” or more fashion designs. 258
In a related vein, Professors Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy
implicitly incorporate the evidentiary framework proposed herein to argue
that the economic incentives provided by lead-time advantage may be
systematically insufficient to reward otherwise unpatentable market
experimentation. Their model suggests that the subject matter of intellectual
property law should be tailored to reward commercialization rather than
invention where lead time is insufficient to induce optimal market
experimentation. Using new business models, such as that of Netflix, as an
256 Memorandum from Jessica G. Jacobs, Law Clerk, Am. Law Div., Copyright

Protection for Fashion Design: A Legal Analysis of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act,
H.R. 2033 6 (June 28, 2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22685_
20070628.pdf (last visited July 27, 2008).
257 See Susan Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion as Information Technology, 59 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 69, 87 (2008) (“While the immediate online availability of photographs of new
styles from the runway or the red carpet contributes to consumer interest in cutting-edge
fashion, it also enables design pirates to offer fast, cheap knockoffs—often before the
original versions are available in stores.”).
258 See, e.g., James Surowiecki, The Piracy Paradox, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 24,
2007 (“There’s little evidence that knockoffs are damaging the business.”).
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example, they then admit that drawing an administrable line to cover
unobvious commercialization efforts is likely infeasible without development
of new institutions. 259
Evidence of the power of overlapping rights can be found in the power
that the PENGUIN CLASSICS mark gives Penguin Group, USA in the
market for books in the public domain. 260 Even in the absence of copyright
protection, publishers find it profitable to invest in competing publications.
In addition to the power of brand recognition, the inducements for these
investments in the absence of copyright protection are that the investment is
less risky because the status of these books as “classics” demonstrates some
demand, and network effects magnify the demand as these books become
required reading in secondary school and “must-read” items for adult book
groups.
In at least one policy debate, however, the availability of alternative
protection through trade secret and contract and other means has been taken
into account. For more than a decade, compilers of non-copyrightable
databases have sought special legislation to give them sui generis exclusive
rights. 261 They made their case successfully to the European Commission, 262
but have thus far failed to persuade the United States Congress. 263 The
Commissioners appear to have a certain amount of buyer’s remorse. 264

B. Administrability
Tailored provisions of the law succeed when the distinctions drawn are
jurisprudentially stable and administratively cost-effective. I combine these
259 See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market

Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 410 (2008) (“A likely reason for the law’s
relative lack of attention to market experimentation is that the relevant institutional
players, such as patent examiners, legislators, and judges, are not well positioned to make
judgments about which market experiments deserve protection.”).
260 See Bill Goldstein, Publishers Give Classics a Makeover, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2003, at C9.
261 See Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109,
1139 (2007) (describing and analyzing the international and national protection of nonoriginal databases in United States and Europe).
262 See Council Directive 96/9, Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20–
28 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!
celexapi!prod! CELEXnumdoc&numdoc31996L0009&model=guichett&lg=en.
263 See Gervais, supra note 261, at 1142.
264 Internal Market Services Directorate General, First Evaluation of Directive
96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases 23–25 (Comm’n of the European Cmtys.,
Working Paper, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/
databases/ evaluation_report_en.pdf.
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two measures into the metric of administrability. If the economic evidence
from the first step of the analysis shows that uniformity cost is particularly
problematic with respect to certain subject matter, a particular industry, or a
particular class of innovator, such as employees of universities, then the legal
analysis turns to the question of institutional form.
This is the part of the analysis for which lawyers are uniquely qualified.
The administrative costs of intellectual property schemes are incurred largely
in domains dominated by lawyers. These costs include bargaining costs, such
as the costs of drafting licenses, litigation costs, and, in the case of patent,
prosecution costs. These costs matter. For example, the substantial costs of
patent prosecution and litigation reduces the expected value from a patent
because there will be some markets in which the surplus available is small
enough that obtaining or enforcing exclusive rights will not be costjustified. 265 Inventors faced with such costs may choose not to invest in
socially beneficial innovation or may opt for trade secret protection where
the disclosure given by an issued patent would be preferable.
Turning now to the proponent’s burden, once specific uniformity costs
have been identified, the proponent must also show that it would be
administratively feasible to tailor rights and that doing so would be costjustified. Demonstrating feasibility means showing (1) that the law can
adequately delineate the subject matter governed by tailored rights and (2)
that such distinctions will be stable enough in practice to defeat arbitrage by
clever attorneys. 266
If tailored rights result in significantly differential treatment of works
under copyright law or inventions under patent law, parties would have an
incentive to characterize works in a less protected category as works
belonging to a category with greater protection. 267 Along these lines, the
265 See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 77, at 215–16 (surveying empirical literature
showing reduction in patent value from high enforcement costs).
266 The few economists who have considered the matter are relatively optimistic
about the stability of tailored protections. See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer,
Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY &
THE ECONOMY 51, 53, 71 (Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2002)
(“[I]ntellectual property regimes should be designed so that the subject matter of each
one has relatively homogeneous needs for protection.”).
267 The phenomenon of legal arbitrage is most familiar in the context of applying
intellectual property laws to new technologies. See, e.g., NBC v. Satellite Broad.
Networks, Inc., 940 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that satellite television
network was a “cable system” eligible to retransmit broadcast television programs under
a statutory license) (superseded by regulation); Satellite Broad. and Commc’n. Ass’n v.
Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 348 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding Copyright Office regulation
rejecting satellite system eligibility for “cable system” license); see also 17 U.S.C.
§§ 119, 122 (2000) (providing separate statutory licenses for satellite retransmissions of
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Court’s holding in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International,
Inc. 268 can be viewed as successful legal arbitrage of the statutory distinction
drawn for patent protection of plants and plant varieties. 269 The
manipulability of language does have its limits however, and relatively stable
definitions of subject matter are possible. Consider, for example, the distinct
treatment that “musical works” and “sound recordings” receive under
copyright law. 270
It is important to stress the pragmatism necessary for the jurisprudential
stability inquiry. A tailoring opponent cannot defeat a proposal merely
because a proposed distinction is not watertight. Most legal distinctions leak.
The pragmatic question in assessing whether the boat can stay afloat is how
bad the leaks are likely to be. Consider the case of patents in methods of
doing business. Congress already has tailored patent law by creating a
defense specific to patents teaching a “method of doing or conducting
business.” 271 How stable is this category? According to Professors Allison
and Tiller, not very. They argue:
Although it is not entirely unheard of for Congress to single out a particular
field for different protective scope under patent law, it is quite rare. In 1996,
Congress granted immunity to medical practitioners and health-care entities
so that they are no longer liable for infringing medical and surgical
procedure patents. That action by Congress has been criticized, though not
widely, because of the difficulties likely to be encountered in defining
“medical or surgical procedures.” Even if one believes that it was socially
optimal to remove the threat of an infringement action so as to give
physicians the freedom to use any procedure they choose, it is unlikely that
a reasonable estimate of costs and benefits would lead to the same
conclusion for business methods. Business practices lack the social
imperative of medical treatments. Moreover, treating different technologies
differently places too great a premium on ex ante definitions, such that the
definitional scheme will be at least partially defeated because of the
significant transaction costs associated with attorney efforts to opt into or

broadcast signals).
268 534 U.S. 124, 145–46 (2001).
269 See, e.g., Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 840 Stat.
1542 (codified in various sections within 7 U.S.C. § 2321); Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35
U.S.C. §§ 161–64 (1994 & Supp. 2000); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179
(1995) (rejecting Federal Circuit’s “crop-by-crop” reading of the PVPA). TRIPS Article
27.3 permits adherents to adopt sui generis protection for plant varieties.
270 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2006) (definitions), 106 (2006) (providing differential
public performance rights to owners of copyrights in musical works and sound
recordings).
271 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006).
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out of a definition by carefully tailoring invention descriptions and patent
claims. 272

Allison and Tiller’s assertions are insufficient to make the case that a
tailoring proposal with respect to business methods must fail on the grounds
of administrability. Assume for the moment that a proponent has shown that
patents on business methods generate substantial uniformity cost either
because they exist or because of their scope. What is the likely magnitude of
transaction costs associated with attempted legal arbitrage? How likely are
those attempts going to succeed? The first point to keep in mind is that this
inquiry is specific to the tailoring proposal that emerges from the first step of
the inquiry.
A principle of proportionality governs the relationship between the first
and second steps of the inquiry: The larger the distinction drawn by a
proposal, the more pressure that distinction must be able to endure. With
respect to business methods, if the proponent is merely trying to promote the
prior user defense in Section 273, 273 the risk of legal arbitrage is relatively
low because a court engaged in the ex post infringement inquiry should be
able to assess whether a particular method claim is of the sort that motivated
the distinction.
What if, instead, Congress or the Federal Circuit were to disaggregate
business methods from patentable subject matter, perhaps by reinstating de
jure what was once a de facto limit on business method patents prior to the
Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street Bank? 274 Professors Allison and
Tiller are right to predict that under such a rule, patent prosecutors would
engage in clever drafting to avoid the subject matter bar. But the relevant
question is what would their likelihood of success be, factoring in a
reasonable period of time for the courts and the PTO to gain experience to
apply the distinction? Are there types of method claims that could be
disguised more readily than others such that the tailoring proponent might be
forced to amend the proposal to exclude only a subset of business method
patents on administrability grounds? Some evidence relevant to these
questions could be drawn from the experience in Europe, and perhaps in
particular in the United Kingdom, which explicitly tailors patentable subject
matter to exclude business methods. 275
272 Allison & Tiller, supra note 181, at 1020–21 (internal citations omitted)
273 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006).
274 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
275 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(2)(c), Oct. 5, 1973,
1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (tailoring patentable subject matter to exclude “schemes, rules and
methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for
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Whether business methods are patentable subject matter remains a
relevant question even after the recent course correction by the en banc
decision of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorori in
In re Bilski. 276 In Bilski, the Federal Circuit was asked by various amici to
interpret the criteria for patentable processes to exclude methods of doing
business 277 or software. 278 Rejecting these arguments for the time being, the
court chose instead to tailor patentable subject matter at what appears to be a
higher level of abstraction. Acknowledging that some form of tailoring would
be required because not every process could be eligible for patent
protection, 279 the court resolved to limit method patents to those that pass the
“machine-or-transformation” test. 280
The court explicitly left open the likelihood of future judicial
development through which categories of excluded subject matter may
emerge. 281 This Article’s framework suggests an analytical guide for the
Supreme Court’s review and future developments that follow therefrom.
Moving to the next stage of the inquiry, demonstrating that tailored rights
are cost-justified requires attention to the costs of complexity, 282 impacts on
licensing, and litigation as the parties and the courts incur greater education

computers”); Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 1(2) (Eng.), available at http://www.ipo.gov.
uk/2006ewcaciv1371.pdf (excludes same patentable subject matter and announces a new
administrative procedure to implement the Aerotel judgment, noting that “[i]t is the
Office’s view that the change in approach does not fundamentally change the boundary
between what is and is not patentable in the UK although we recognise that there will
inevitably be the odd case right on the boundary that may be decided differently under
different tests.”); see also Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holding Ltd. [2006] EWCA 1371 (Civ),
at ¶ 8–49 (discussing challenges to application of exclusions and providing methodology
for administrative and judicial application in future cases).
276 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
277 See id. at 960 n.22 (quoting brief of amicus Financial Services Industries).
278 See id. at 960 n.23 (“[A]lthough invited to do so by several amici, we decline to
adopt a broad exclusion over software or any other such category of subject matter
beyond the exclusion of claims drawn to fundamental principles set forth by the Supreme
Court.”).
279 Id. at 952 (“But the Supreme Court has held that the meaning of ‘process’ as
used in § 101 is narrower than its ordinary meaning.”).
280 See id. at 954 (“A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it
is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing.”).
281 Id. at 956 (anticipating future developments).
282 For a vigorous argument against legal complexity in copyright law, see generally
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (surveying history of copyright legislation
as business-to-business negotiations leading to ever more complex statutory provisions).
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costs to master the more complex rules. 283 At first glance, tailored rights
would appear to be more complex and more administratively expensive than
uniform rights. The working assumption for many lawyers appears to be that
greater complexity in the law necessarily leads to greater administrative
costs. This easy syllogism, however, is open to question because complexity
does not necessarily equate with greater administrative costs.
Where a proponent has shown that the risk of arbitrage can be minimized
because legal terminology has relatively stable meanings, greater complexity
may actually reduce licensing and litigation costs by creating better-tailored
default rules. To the extent that one is persuaded by the Demsetz theory of
property rights, 284 one might agree. With intellectual property the Demsetz
theory must admit a corollary which is that as the magnitude of identifiable
deadweight loss caused by intellectual property rights increases, pressure will
mount to greater specify rights so as to avoid those losses. 285 This view
might explain why the most arcane and complex portions of the Copyright
Act, for example, are not the provisions over which most litigation resources
are expended. The greater specificity may lead to less costly assessments of
the value of particular transactions or disputes. Indeed, it is the effort to apply
broad standards such as the idea/expression dichotomy or general standards
embedded in the fair use doctrine that generate the uncertainty on which
litigious impulses feed. 286 To the extent that today’s meanings are
destabilized by technological advance, greater industry-specificity may

283 This analysis implicates—or is a species of—larger conversations about the

choice between rules and standards or the optimal specificity of law. See, e.g., Colin S.
Diver, Regulatory Precision, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 200 (K. Hawkins & J.
Thomas eds., 1989); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65, 65–66 (1984); see generally Francisco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, in 2
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 510–15 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich
Schneider eds., 2006) (summarizing traditional economic analysis of issue of optimal
specificity).
284 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 350 (1967) (arguing that property rights emerge when the benefits of internalization
are greater than administrative costs); see also Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of
“Toward a Theory of Property Rights”, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 127, 127 (2008) (response);
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317–21 (1993) (surveying
literature); Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3
REV. L. & ECON. 649, 652–53 (2007) (arguing against expansion of copyright as a means
of internalizing all externalities).
285 Cf. Smith, supra note 136, at 1789–90 (arguing that as information costs
concerning uses governed by intellectual property rights fall, demand for greater
specificity of rights will increase).
286 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1085, 1098–1106
(2007) (documenting fair use uncertainty and proposing administrative remedy).
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actually facilitate better policymaking by forcing decisionmakers to confront
the economics of the new technology.
Nonetheless, concerns about greater administrative costs and legal
arbitrage rightly counsel caution when analyzing the desirability of tailoring.
These concerns also lead one to favor the more flexible approach of judicial
tailoring when a desirable change in the law can be accomplished either
judicially or legislatively. But some dimensions of the current rights structure
can be altered only legislatively, and we should opt for this approach when
the costs of uniformity are particularly high in a given context.

C. Political Economy
The framework proposed in Subsections V.A and V.B sketches a model
for the respective legal and economic analyses of intellectual property rights
as aspects of national innovation policy. Scholars can make their greatest
contributions by gathering evidence and focusing analysis on the sources of
uniformity cost and administratively feasible solutions. However, because the
proposed framework is designed to be practical and effective, policymakers
and advocates must also consider the question of political economy when
assessing potential tailoring measures and the institutional form that they
should take.
As signaled at the opening of this Section, the question of comparative
institutional analysis is a large one requiring book-length treatment. 287 In
their book, Professors Burk and Lemley strongly favor judicial tailoring over
other institutional solutions. 288 While I sympathize with their intuitions, for
purposes of this framework, the institutional form of tailoring should remain
flexible and be based on evidence of likely efficacy. Space allows room for
only a few preliminary observations to defend this point. As Burk and
Lemley’s analysis suggests, tailoring proposals are likely to hit their toughest
sledding when faced with the political economy defense for uniformity. On
balance, considerations of political economy support an argument that
tailoring through judicial or administrative interpretation is more likely to
succeed than legislative tailoring. That said, some specific responses to the
reflexive argument that legislative tailoring will necessarily lead to greater
inefficiency in intellectual property law need to be made.
First, consider the special industry-specific deals encoded in Sections
108–122 of the Copyright Act. 289 It cannot be categorically stated that each
of these measures makes the law less efficient than a law with strictly
287 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1997).
288 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 110, at 95–108.
289 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–22 (2006).
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uniform rights. On the contrary, a quick run through of the first two prongs of
this framework suggests that many of these measures were drafted in
response to arguments about market failure or other forms of what we now
recognize to be uniformity cost and that even as enacted these either reduce
uniformity cost or are simply superfluous. Perhaps the strongest example of a
measure that reduces uniformity cost is the limit on copyrightability of useful
articles in Section 113. In the absence of this limit, parties could readily
evade the more stringent requirements of patentability and receive patent-like
protection for articles that patent law would designate as part of the public
domain. It is useful to note that this limit entered the law through judicial
tailoring under the Copyright Act of 1909 and was subsequently ratified by
Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976.
Second, those who would argue that a legislative environment more
conducive to special pleading by industry groups would increase the social
costs of intellectual property rights must take full account of the evidence.
Consider the extreme cases of those industries that have sought sui generis
rights. The record indicates that in the United States in recent history they are
two for four. The semiconductor chip industry received protection for mask
works, 290 and the boat manufacturers received a special deal in the wake of
Bonito Boats. 291 Neither of these deals appear to have imposed significant
social costs, although the record on boat hulls is harder to parse. By contrast,
the database industry is internally divided as is the fashion industry. These
internal divisions have undermined their respective legislative campaigns for
sui generis rights. These internal divisions reflect the realization that
expanded intellectual property rights would impose significant private costs
as well as social costs.
As public choice theory suggests, the risk of an environment more
conducive to special pleading is highest when expanded rights would
increase private profits for the majority of industry players while increasing
social cost. The fear that this will routinely be the case should be diminished
by recognition that all information-intensive sectors treat information as both
input and output. As long as a substantial subset of industry players is more
concerned about access to inputs than control over outputs, the public choice
risks associated with a more tailoring-friendly legislative environment are
lower than advertised. 292
290 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14 (2006).
291 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989)

(holding state law protection of boat hull designs preempted by federal law); 17 U.S.C.
§ 130(a)(2) (2006) (granting federal sui generis protection to boat design features).
292 Cf. Smith, supra note 136, at 1813–14 (recognizing that likely success of
legislative tailoring initiative depends on specificity of uses governed by proposed
measure).
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Since overall the legislative record shows a trend toward expansion of
the subject matter, scope, and duration of intellectual property rights
resulting from consensus among information-intensive industry groups that
greater control is worth more than easier access, the discipline argument
must show that this trend would be steeper in a tailoring-friendly
environment. As with the rest of the framework, arguments about the likely
effects of political economy on any particular tailoring proposal or class of
proposals should be based on evidence. Categorical dismissal of legislative
tailoring as efficiency-promoting is not supported by the evidence.
The reason to be skeptical about the likelihood that legislative tailoring
will succeed is not so much that industry groups will more successfully seek
rents, but that interest groups will be more successful than the courts at
killing or diluting tailoring measures that would improve the efficiency of the
law by constraining subject matter, scope, or duration. This is because the
current subject matter, scope, and duration provisions of patent and copyright
law indicate that most uniformity costs result from overprotection rather than
underprotection. Starting from this statutory baseline, industry-specific
legislative tailoring pursuant to the knowledge corollary would likely involve
reducing protection for given industries. Some measures that would do so
have been introduced into Congress, but they are given little hope of
enactment.
Unlike most commentators, I am less pessimistic about the long-term
prospects for legislative tailoring. Heightened attention to the economic
importance of intellectual property includes attention to the costs of
intellectual property rights generally. In particular, the patent premium
reflected in the prices of pharmaceutical drugs is of front-burner legislative
interest. In addition, as the costs of intellectual property rights become more
apparent, users and interested third parties who bear those costs will be more
willing to pay the price for collective action. Finally, because valuable
information is an input to the creation of other valuable information,
industry-specific rent-seeking by one industry may well align the interests of
other industries with consumers more generally, reducing the threat of
successful overreaching.
Because political economy raises particular risks for legislative tailoring,
a more immediately attainable goal for using the knowledge corollary to
reduce deadweight loss is to improve industry-specific tailoring in the courts.
The most successful example of this kind of judicial response has been two
aspects of copyright for software.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When Justice Stephen Breyer was a young law professor, he made an
unconventional choice for the topic of his tenure piece—copyright law. 293 At
the time, the dynamic field we now call “intellectual property” was not
generally considered a unified field within American law schools, and its
separate branches of copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret were not
generally considered subjects for keen interest among rising scholars.
Anticipating the growth of the field, however, Breyer had chosen his topic in
part because a decades-long legislative process to revise the Copyright Act
appeared close to fruition.
While Breyer’s contribution to a tradition of copyright skepticism 294
caused quite a stir at the time among lawyers for the copyright-dependent
industries, 295 Congress chose to proceed with the planned expansion of
copyright. Breyer’s article offers a more lasting contribution in the form of a
more general pragmatic, evidence-based approach to the economic analysis
of intellectual property law. In particular, by analyzing the economics of
book publishing, Breyer expressed unease about the need for copyright as a
tool for encouraging dissemination of knowledge, and he argued from his
data that arguments for the benefits of an expanded copyright law were
largely unfounded.
Using the emerging tools of economic analysis applied to law, Breyer
summarized his “fairly comprehensive method for analyzing copyright
problems,” 296 by first reminding his critics that the justification for granting
copyright rights cannot solely be that copiers have an economic advantage
over initial producers because the copiers do not bear the costs of creating the
work. 297 Rather, he argued, one should first ask (1) what market-based
advantages might creators have from which they can recoup the costs of
creation; (2) does the government subsidize the costs of creation; and (3)
might consumers find ways to channel funds to the creator to finance
creation costs? 298 The answers to these inquiries would set the baseline from
which one would measure the marginal benefits that any level of copyright

293 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
294 See, e.g., Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1
ECONOMICA 167, 167–68 (1934).
295 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 22–26 (1994) (describing the impact of Breyer’s article).
296 See Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75, 75 (1972).
297 Id. at 75–76.
298 Id. at 76.
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rights might yield. Breyer continued that even when copyright rights might
yield marginal benefits, policy makers must attend to the costs that copyright
imposes, such as diminishing circulation and utilization of useful
information. 299 Subsequent economic analysis of intellectual property law
has largely eschewed evidence-based analysis for more abstract modeling.
However, as policy debates around intellectual property continue to intensify,
and as abstract economic models offer little guidance about how to resolve
these debates, Breyer’s methodological approach is ripe for revival.
This Article builds on more recent learning from the economic analysis
of intellectual property law to refine and extend Breyer’s approach. In
particular, the framework proposed herein generalizes to incorporate both
copyright and patent law within its scope and refines the empirical questions
that should be asked and answered to improve intellectual property policy.
One-size-fits-all patents and copyrights are necessarily inefficient even if one
accounts for the various ways in which market measures, real options, and
flexible standards can be used to reduce uniformity cost. Ultimately,
intellectual property law still needs tailoring. Legislative distinctions between
patents and copyrights reflects tailoring at a high level of abstraction, and
these rights have been further tailored by Congress, the federal courts, the
PTO, and the Copyright Office over time. This Article proposes a practical
framework for analyzing the merits of existing and proposed tailoring
measures. The framework focuses analysis on the relative abilities of
government officials or private creators or innovators to pick winners in the
innovative and creative fields of endeavor, the administrability of a particular
policy, and the considerations of political economy that should influence any
ultimate policy proposals.

299 Id.

